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I.

INTRODUCTION

Assume that five unrelated actors use minors to commit five
similar crimes at exactly the same time in five different states. First,
seventeen-year-old defendant A uses various other minors who are
actually older than defendant A to purchase and sell heroin in New
1
York. Second, eighteen-year-old defendant B uses a sixteen-year-old
minor and a seventeen-year-old minor to utter counterfeit money in
2
Michigan. Third, eighteen-year-old defendant C uses a sixteen-yearold minor and a seventeen-year-old minor to rob a bank in
3
Minnesota. Fourth, twenty-year-old defendant D uses a seventeen4
year-old minor to rob a bank in Tennessee. Fifth, nineteen-year-old
defendant E uses his seventeen-year-old girlfriend to purchase
1. See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
2. See United States v. Borkowski, 21 F. App’x 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001).
3. See United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1029–30 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005).
4. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2000).
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substances used to manufacture methamphetamine in Iowa. Section
3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)
mandates a two-level sentence enhancement for defendants who use
6
minors to commit federal crimes. One would assume that each of
these five defendants would receive the same two-level sentence
enhancement for using a minor to commit a crime. Not so fast. Instead
of a uniform application of section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement,
the defendants who committed these five similar crimes with minors
will not be treated similarly when they stand before federal sentencing
7
8
courts in different jurisdictions. Defendants C and E will receive the
9
10
11
enhancement; defendants A, B, and D will not. What accounts for
this disparity in sentencing these similarly situated federal defendants
who used minors to commit these offenses?
The sentencing disparity results from a split of authority on the
issue of whether the United States Sentencing Commission
(Sentencing Commission) exceeded its authority in promulgating a
use-of-minor enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age,
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense. Congress directed the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement
that ensures that the defendant’s age is relevant by focusing on adult
defendants at least twenty-one years old who use minors to commit
federal offenses. The Sentencing Commission defied Congress’s
directive by making a defendant’s age absolutely irrelevant for
purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement. Federal courts’ divergent
approach to the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-of-minor
enhancement created the sentencing disparities referred to above.
Instead of none of the defendants listed above receiving the use-ofminor enhancement, which would track Congress’s intent, some
defendants receive the enhancement; some do not.
This Article takes a systematic and thorough approach to
explaining how federal district courts can respond to the Sentencing
Commission’s defiance of congressional intent and unlawful
expansion of its limited authority. This Article will explain how
federal sentencing courts can carry out Congress’s intent to impose
5. See United States v. Harris, 390 F.3d 572, 572 (8th Cir. 2004).
6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2011).
7. See Wingate, 369 F.3d at 1032.
8. See Harris, 390 F.3d at 572–73.
9. See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
10. See United States v. Borkowski, 21 F. App’x 345, 346–47 (6th Cir. 2001).
11. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2000).
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use-of-minor enhancements only on adult defendants at least twentyone years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses.
Part II develops the plain language of the congressional directive
to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor
enhancement with an age restriction for defendants. Specifically,
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences
for defendants at least twenty-one years of age who use minors to
commit federal offenses and, in doing so, to consider the proximity in
age between the defendant and minor. Part III shows how the
Sentencing Commission responded to the congressional directive by
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement that altogether eliminated
the relevance of a defendant’s age. Part IV then recounts the split
among federal courts over the issue of whether the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its congressional authority in promulgating a
use-of-minor enhancement that makes the age of the defendant
irrelevant. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is on one side of the debate—the minority side, and the side on
which this Article stakes its position—with the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits on the
other side.
Because district courts will undoubtedly continue to confront the
issue of whether section 3B1.4 can be applied to defendants under the
age of twenty-one, this issue needs to be explored and analyzed more
fully than it already has. This Article seeks to add a stronger voice and
a more solid foundation for the conclusion that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority by eliminating the relevance of the
defendant’s age in applying a two-level use-of-minor enhancement. To
that end, the analysis in Part V provides additional support for the
conclusion that Congress did not intend that defendants under the age
of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal offenses should
receive sentence enhancements; it also maintains that Congress
certainly did not intend that the age of the defendant and the
proximity in age between the defendant and minor would be rendered
wholly irrelevant. In a nutshell, Part V argues that the congressional
directive’s plain language, legislative history, and context in which it
was enacted require the conclusion that Congress intended the
Sentencing Commission to retain age as a relevant factor in applying
the use-of-minor enhancement. Applying this reasoning, district
courts can adopt what this Article describes as the “no-authority
option” to hold that because the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
authority in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement without age
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restrictions for defendants, section 3B1.4 will not be applied to
defendants under the age of twenty-one. Until the Supreme Court of
the United States adopts or rejects the no-authority option,
defendants under the age of twenty-one will receive markedly
disparate sentences depending on where they commit their federal
offenses.
Notwithstanding the circuit split on the issue of the Sentencing
Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4 without age
restrictions, all district courts—no matter in which circuit they
reside—have the discretion to abrogate the Sentencing Commission’s
expansion of the use-of-minor enhancement that makes the
defendant’s age irrelevant. District courts are not necessarily
confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition to utilize the noauthority option. On the contrary, Part VI explains that regardless of
a court’s—or even the Court’s—position on the soundness of adopting
the no-authority option, every district court has the authority under an
advisory-guidelines system to reject the application of the use-ofminor enhancement to defendants under the age of twenty-one. First,
district courts can utilize what this Article calls the “policydisagreement option” to explicitly lodge a policy disagreement against
the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement by
rejecting its application to defendants under the age of twenty-one.
Second, district courts can decide, on a case-by-case basis, to adopt
what this Article calls the “individualized-assessment option” to
determine that section 3B1.4’s two-level use-of-minor enhancement
should not be applied to a particular defendant under twenty-one
years of age in a particular case because it would result in an excessive
sentence.
No matter whether federal courts ultimately adopt the noauthority option, policy-disagreement option, or individualizedassessment option, this Article should equip federal courts with a
three-part analytical framework that can be used to reject the
Sentencing Commission’s expansion of its authority and open
defiance of Congress’s intent. By choosing one of these three options,
federal courts will carry out Congress’s intent to apply the useof-minor enhancement only to defendants at least twenty-one years of
age.
II. CONGRESS DIRECTED THE SENTENCING COMMISSION TO
PROMULGATE A USE-OF-MINOR ENHANCEMENT FOR DEFENDANTS
AT LEAST TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE WHO USE MINORS UNDER
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THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN TO COMMIT FEDERAL OFFENSES

Eighteen years ago, Congress enacted the substantial Violent
12
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Crime Bill).
According to the United States Department of Justice, the Crime Bill
took “six years of hard work” to enact and “is the largest crime bill in
13
the history of the country.” As a small part of this massive piece of
legislation, Congress drafted eight sections specifically dealing with
14
youth violence. In section 140008, entitled “Solicitation of Minor to
Commit Crime,” Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to
“promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a
defendant 21 years of age or older who has been convicted of an
offense shall receive an appropriate sentence enhancement if the
15
defendant involved a minor in the commission of the offense.”
Congress further instructed the Sentencing Commission as follows:
provide that the guideline enhancement . . . shall apply for any
offense in relation to which the defendant has solicited,
procured, recruited, counseled, encouraged, trained, directed,
commanded, intimidated, or otherwise used or attempted to use
any person less than 18 years of age with the intent that the
16
minor would commit a Federal offense.
A fair characterization of this congressional directive is that
Congress intended that the Sentencing Commission adopt a use-ofminor enhancement for adult defendants at least twenty-one years of
age who use minors under the age of eighteen to commit federal
offenses.
Congress did not simply direct the Sentencing Commission to
adopt a use-of-minor enhancement with a twenty-one-year-old age
restriction without providing additional instruction. Congress also
charged that when promulgating a guideline, the Sentencing
Commission must consider, among other factors, “the possible
relevance of the proximity in age between the offender and the
17
minor(s) involved in the offense.” By instructing the Sentencing
12. Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
13. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (Oct. 24, 1994), http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt.
14. See §§ 140001–140008, 108 Stat. at 2031–33.
15. Id. § 140008(a)(1) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 140008(a)(2) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 140008(b)(4) (emphasis added); see also id. § 140008(b)(1)–(3) (charging the
Sentencing Commission to also consider the following: “(1) the severity of the crime that
the defendant intended the minor to commit; (2) the number of minors that the defendant
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Commission to consider the proximity in age between the defendant
and the minor, Congress continued to reveal its intent that the age of
the defendant is important in applying a use-of-minor enhancement.
Congress revealed its belief that the greater the age proximity, the
greater the importance that a defendant at least twenty-one years old
should receive enhanced punishment for using a minor to commit a
federal offense. Congress expressed less concern about enhanced
punishment in cases where a defendant and a minor are close to being
the same age. Notably, Congress revealed no intent that the
Sentencing Commission should consider eliminating the relevance of
the defendant’s age or the proximity in age between the defendant
and the minor used.
Viewing all pieces of the congressional directive—the age
restriction of “21 years of age or older” for defendants, the age
restriction of less than eighteen years of age for minors, the
“proximity in age” restriction, and the directive’s title—Congress
revealed its intent to punish adults at least twenty-one years of age
who use younger minors under the age of eighteen to commit federal
offenses. If the Sentencing Commission chose to increase punishment
for adult defendants much older than the minor used, then nothing in
the directive foreclosed such a decision. If the Sentencing Commission
chose to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age altogether,
however, then Congress’s efforts to focus enhanced punishment on
adult defendants who are older than the minors used are rendered
impotent. The most reasonable interpretation of the congressional
directive’s plain language indicates an intent to enhance the sentences
of adults who corrupt young people by recruiting them into crime; it
does not indicate an intent to enhance sentences for defendants who
are nearly the same age or younger than the minors used. Although
the term use-of-minor enhancement readily rolls off the lips, it actually
misdirects the debate by scrubbing any reference to an age restriction
for defendants. Perhaps a term that more accurately reflects
Congress’s intent would be a corruption-of-a-minor-by-an-adult-atleast-twenty-one-years-of-age enhancement. Notwithstanding the
technical accuracy of that term, it is not exactly a tongue-friendly
description of the enhancement.

used or attempted to use in relation to the offense; [and] (3) the fact that involving a minor
in a crime of violence is frequently of even greater seriousness than involving a minor in a
drug trafficking offense, for which the [G]uidelines already provide a two-level
enhancement”).
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No matter the proper coinage for the enhancement, a simple
reading of the directive’s text shows that Congress purposefully listed
the defendant’s age and the proximity in age between the defendant
and minor to ensure that the Sentencing Commission promulgated an
enhancement to punish the appropriate defendants who use minors to
commit federal offenses. Can Congress’s directive to the Sentencing
Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement be
reasonably interpreted to encompass every defendant, regardless of
age? Is it a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of section
140008’s directive to conclude that Congress did not in any way
restrict the Sentencing Commission from adopting a use-of-minor
enhancement that eliminated the relevance of the defendant’s age? As
described in Part III, the Sentencing Commission eliminated any age
restriction for defendants when it promulgated the use-of-minor
enhancement, making the defendant’s age entirely irrelevant in
sentencing.
III. SENTENCING COMMISSION PROMULGATED A USE-OF-MINOR
ENHANCEMENT TO APPLY TO ALL DEFENDANTS, REGARDLESS OF
AGE
Acting under the specific congressional directive detailed in
section 140008, the Sentencing Commission faithfully implemented a
sentence enhancement for adult defendants at least twenty-one years
of age who use minors to commit federal offenses. The Sentencing
Commission did not stop with adult defendants who are at least
twenty-one years old, however. By its own admission, the Sentencing
Commission promulgated a use-of-minor enhancement “in a slightly
18
broader form” than directed by Congress: “If the defendant used or
attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit
the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the
19
offense, increase by 2 levels.” The result of the Sentencing
Commission’s broadening of the enhancement’s reach is that every
defendant, regardless of age, will receive the same two-level
enhancement for using a minor to commit a federal offense. The
Sentencing Commission rendered the defendant’s age and the
proximity in age between the defendant and minor irrelevant for
sentencing purposes.

18.
19.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 527 (2003).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2011).
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The process of promulgating the use-of-minor enhancement (or
any guideline for that matter) did not end with the Sentencing
Commission’s creation of the enhancement. The Sentencing
Commission is required to submit its proposed guidelines and reasons
20
for promulgating them to Congress. Congress gave itself a 180-day
review period during which it can reject, modify, or approve a
21
proposed guideline. If Congress takes no action on a proposed
22
guideline, then it automatically takes effect. In submitting the use-ofminor enhancement without age restrictions to Congress, the
Sentencing Commission provided shallow support for the
enhancement: “Reason for Amendment: This amendment implements
the directive in Section 140008 of the [Crime Bill] (pertaining to the
use of a minor in the commission of an offense) in a slightly broader
23
form.” The Sentencing Commission provided no policy reasons why
it eliminated age as a relevant factor for sentencing defendants who
use minors to commit federal offenses. Congress did not take action to
reject or modify the Sentencing Commission’s use-of-minor
enhancement; therefore, the proposed guideline automatically took
effect as section 3B1.4.
Although Congress did not reject the Sentencing Commission’s
use-of-minor enhancement’s “slightly broader form,” Congress did
express its disapproval for another proposed guideline that was
24
submitted to Congress along with the use-of-minor enhancement.
Specifically, Congress reiterated its support for treating crack cocaine
much harsher than powder cocaine under the Guidelines by
disapproving the Sentencing Commission’s proposed guideline “that
would have eliminated the 100:1 sentencing ratio that treats one who
deals in a given quantity of crack cocaine the same as it treats one who
25
deals in 100 times as much powder cocaine.”
By laying out the congressional directive and the Sentencing
Commission’s response, the stage has been set for a discussion of
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional
authority by scrubbing any reference to the age of a defendant in
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed.
Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995).
24. See id. at 25076–77 (proposing a guideline to lessen the sentencing disparities
between crack cocaine and powder cocaine).
25. United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 845 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Act of Oct.
30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334, 334 (1995).
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imposing the same enhanced sentence for every defendant who uses
of a minor to commit a federal offense. This Article asks whether
Congress’s directive—including its plain language, legislative history,
and the context in which it was enacted—can be fairly interpreted as
depicting an intent to apply the same two-level use-of-minor
enhancement to every defendant regardless of the defendant’s age or
the proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used.
Federal courts have disagreed on the answer to this consequential
question. This Article contends that Congress used clear, direct,
unambiguous, and specific language to ensure that the age of the
defendant was relevant for sentencing purposes, particularly when the
plain language of the directive’s text is read in context with other parts
of the Crime Bill and the directive’s legislative history. Based on
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adult defendants at
least twenty-one years of age who use minors to commit federal
offenses, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by
ignoring Congress’s focus on age and instead promulgated a use-ofminor enhancement that applies the same enhancement to every
defendant—no matter how old or how young.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS SPLIT ON WHETHER THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN PROMULGATING
SECTION 3B1.4 WITHOUT AN AGE RESTRICTION FOR DEFENDANTS
Courts have inconsistently interpreted the scope of the
Sentencing Commission’s authority when promulgating section
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Sentencing Commission
26
exceeded its authority for two reasons. First, Congress’s words must
have meaning; they lose meaning when the Sentencing Commission
ignores Congress’s plain language—a use-of-minor enhancement
without any age restriction contradicts the congressional directive to
include an age restriction. Second, Congress’s intent is gleaned from
the directive’s text and legislative history, not from its silent failure to
reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded enhancement during a
review period. Four circuit courts—the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits—
determined that the Sentencing Commission acted within its
significant discretion in adopting the enhancement without any age

26.

See Butler, 207 F.3d at 849.
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27

restrictions for defendants. These courts provide one or more of the
following reasons for deferring to the Sentencing Commission’s
decision to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age in applying
the use-of-minor enhancement. First, the enhancement is technically
not at odds with the directive because defendants at least twenty-one
years of age will always receive the enhancement. Second, the
Sentencing Commission could have determined that every
defendant—regardless of age—can exert as much negative influence
over minors as twenty-one-year-old defendants. Third, because
Congress did not reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded
enhancement during the 180-day review period, Congress displayed its
true intent not by the language used in the directive, but by its silence
in not rejecting the proposed guideline. Finally, a federal district court
in New York refused to apply the use-of-minor enhancement to a
defendant who was himself a minor and used minors who were older
than he to commit a federal offense. This Article will now explore
these decisions in turn.
A.

Sixth Circuit Held that the Sentencing Commission Exceeded Its
Congressional Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without
an Age Restriction

Of the federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
whether section 3B1.4 constitutes a reasonable implementation of
Congress’s directive, the Sixth Circuit is the only court to hold that the
Sentencing Commission had no authority to enact it without age
28
restrictions. Similar to the split among the circuit courts, the issue did
29
not enjoy unanimity from the Sixth Circuit panel that decided it.
In United States v. Butler, twenty-year-old Julius Retic and a
30
seventeen-year-old minor robbed a bank. Retic pleaded guilty to
31
armed bank robbery and to the use of a firearm during the robbery.
Imposing a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4,

27. See United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147,
1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2001).
28. See Butler, 207 F.3d at 849.
29. See id. at 841 (explaining that the separate opinion of Judge Jones in Part II.B.1.
is the majority opinion and “constitutes the opinion of the court on the issue addressed in
Part II.B.1.”).
30. Id. at 842.
31. Id.
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the district court sentenced Retic to 120 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Retic argued that because section 3B1.4 applies to defendants
of any age, it exceeded the scope of Congress’s mandate to the
Sentencing Commission that included a twenty-one-year-old age
33
restriction.
Over the voice of a dissenting judge, the two-judge majority
concluded “that the United States Sentencing Commission failed to
comport with a clear congressional directive when it eliminated the
requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-one years old to be
34
subject to enhancement under [section] 3B1.4.” Evincing a clear
understanding that Congress delegated significant discretion to the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines, the Sixth Circuit
observed that the Supreme Court has made clear that the Sentencing
35
Commission must still “bow to the specific directives of Congress.”
Citing its own Sixth Circuit precedent, the court further recognized
that courts must only defer to the Sentencing Commission’s
interpretation of a congressional directive if the interpretation is
36
“sufficiently reasonable.”
Confronting the reasonableness of the Sentencing Commission’s
decision to remove age restrictions from the use-of-minor
enhancement, the Sixth Circuit stated that it could “not conceive of a
clearer example than that presented here where the [Sentencing]
37
Commission has so flatly ignored a clear Congressional directive.”
Despite the clear directive to the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate guidelines “to provide that a defendant 21 years of age or
older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an
appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor
38
in the commission of the offense,” the Sixth Circuit was alarmed that
39
“the [Sentencing] Commission simply removed the age restriction.”
“Looking at the face of both the directive and the guideline,” the
court declared that it was “not convinced that the [Sentencing]
Commission’s interpretation of the age restriction is ‘sufficiently
40
reasonable.’” Instead, the court concluded that the Sentencing
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See id. at 844.
Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
Id. at 850 (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1796, 2033 (1994)).
Id.
Id.

218

S OUTH T EXAS L AW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:205

Commission’s proposed guideline “was a direct overruling of an
explicit Congressional declaration because it eliminated the age limit,
41
lock, stock[,] and barrel.”
The Sixth Circuit flatly rejected the Sentencing Commission’s
characterization that it simply implemented the congressional
42
directive in a “slightly broader form.” The court believed that by
“reflexively relying” on how the Sentencing Commission
characterized its own proposed guideline, courts would, in effect, be
improperly abandoning their judicial role in deciding whether a
43
guideline accurately reflected congressional intent. The court was
hardly persuaded that the wholesale elimination of the minimum-age
44
requirement was simply “slightly broader” than Congress’s directive.
Calling section 3B1.4 “far more dramatic” than Congress’s directive,
the court highlighted some foreseeable consequences stemming from
the elimination of an age restriction: “As this case demonstrates,
without the age limit that Congress originally authorized, the
guideline introduces a whole host of situations where defendants
under age twenty[-]one can receive enhancements for engaging in
criminal activities with youths of similar age, or perhaps even older
45
than the defendants themselves.”
The Sixth Circuit explained that the age restriction was “a core
46
aspect” of the congressional directive to the Sentencing Commission.
The court surmised that Congress created the age restriction out of a
“concern that the existence of an age differential allows an older,
adult party to influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous
47
behavior.” The court explained that it “is hardly a novel concept” for
the law to consider the ages of an adult defendant and a minor
48
accomplice in lawmaking.

41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 527
(2003)).
43. Id. (citing United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
44. Id. at 850–51.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 851.
47. Id.; see also United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir.
2008) (revealing that the district court believed that “[t]he spirit of the [section 3B1.4]
enhancement is to punish adults who exploit minors” such that section 3B1.4 does not
apply to a defendant who begins using minors when the defendant is also a minor).
48. Butler, 207 F.3d at 851 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(a) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(d) (West 2008) (“Any person 21 years of
age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is
under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony . . . .”)).
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Finally, the Sixth Circuit confronted the so-called congressional
silence theory that Congress’s failure to reject the Sentencing
Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement during the review
period revealed that Congress implicitly accepted the enhancement as
49
a true reflection of congressional intent. Noting that the Supreme
Court has counseled that “[n]ot every silence is pregnant” and that
silence is not dispositive “when it is contrary to all other textual and
contextual evidence of congressional intent,” the Sixth Circuit
determined that “the original twenty-one[-]year[-]old age limit is
50
sufficiently clear to overcome an argument from silence.”
Expounding on why it would not rely on the congressional silence
theory to allow the Sentencing Commission to remove all age
restrictions from a use-of-minor enhancement, the Sixth Circuit
explained that to do “so would lead courts wholly to abandon their
role of assessing whether enacted guidelines comport with
51
congressional intent.” The court cautioned that because every
proposed guideline is subject to congressional review and every
enacted guideline has survived congressional rejection, blind
adherence to the congressional silence theory “would thus dictate that
all enacted guidelines inherently satisfied [c]ongressional intent, and
would eliminate [the judiciary’s] vital role . . . of squaring the enacted
52
guideline with the original statutory language.” The Sixth Circuit
pleaded for courts to “hold[] the [Sentencing] Commission
53
accountable as an agency of limited powers.”
Not all of the judges on the Butler panel agreed that the
Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority in promulgating
section 3B1.4. Judge Clay issued a dissenting opinion in which he first
acknowledged that Congress had limited the enhancement to
defendants at least twenty-one years of age, while the Sentencing
Commission dropped the age restriction entirely, “rendering the
54
sentence enhancement applicable to defendants of all ages.” Judge
Clay further acknowledged that “[a]t first blush, it appears . . . that
Congress intended—and provided in unambiguous terms—for
sentence enhancement for solicitation of a minor to commit crime
49. See id.
50. Id. (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 852 (first alteration in original) (quoting Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers,
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1748 (1992)).
54. Id. at 844 (Clay, J., dissenting).
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55

only for defendants age 21 and older.” Judge Clay even declared, “A
56
clearer expression of congressional intent is unimaginable.”
Conceding that there is “some facial appeal” to the argument that
defendants under the age of twenty-one should not receive a use-ofminor enhancement, Judge Clay was not persuaded that the plain
57
language of Congress’s directive controls the issue.
According to Judge Clay, “Congress’[s] expression of intent as to
[section] 3B1.4 did not begin and end with its enactment of [section]
58
140008.” Instead of focusing on the congressional directive as
indicative of Congress’s intent, Judge Clay chose to focus on the
180-day review period, under which Congress’s failure to reject the
59
Sentencing Commission’s proposed guideline carried consequences.
Judge Clay explained that the Sentencing Commission had expressly
informed Congress that it had implemented the congressional
directive in a “slightly broader form,” which did not persuade
60
Congress to reject the proposed guideline. Judge Clay also found it
telling that Congress did not reject the proposed use-of-minor
enhancement even though Congress rejected some of the Sentencing
Commission’s other proposed guidelines that were submitted at the
61
same time.
Based on “this historical backdrop” and “context,” Judge Clay
determined that Congress’s failure to reject the Sentencing
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement “even when notified that it
was different from the directive enacted in [section] 140008, Congress,
in effect, approved of [the enhancement] as an appropriate reflection
of its policy on the sentencing of those who involved minors in their
62
crimes.” Judge Clay actually agreed that Congress’s “initial intent”
to limit the enhancement to defendants at least twenty-one years old
63
would have been at odds with section 3B1.4. But Judge Clay was
persuaded that “the history behind the passage of [section] 3B1.4
compels a finding that the intent of Congress changed” when
“Congress ultimately failed to express disagreement with expansion of

55. Id. at 845 (emphases added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 844–45.
58. Id. at 845.
59. Id. at 844.
60. Id. at 845 (quoting Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995)).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 845–46.
63. Id. at 846.
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the enhancement to include defendants under the age of [twenty64
one].” Based on this reasoning, Judge Clay would have held that
65
section 3B1.4 was not at odds with the intent of Congress.
Less than two years after Butler, the Sixth Circuit again
confronted the issue of whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded
its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. In United States v.
Borkowski, Melisa Borkowski pleaded guilty to uttering counterfeit
66
currency when she was eighteen years old. Because Borkowski had
used two minor friends, one who was seventeen years old and the
other sixteen, the district court applied a two-level use-of-minor
67
enhancement under section 3B1.4. The enhancement resulted in a
sentencing range of between twenty-one and twenty-seven months’
68
imprisonment. The district court sentenced Borkowski to twenty-one
69
months’ imprisonment.
Borkowski appealed her sentence, claiming that section 3B1.4’s
70
use-of-minor enhancement exceeded congressional authorization.
Addressing the issue on appeal, the Sixth Circuit explained that after
oral arguments but before the panel could issue a decision, another
Sixth Circuit panel had already decided Butler, which “explicitly” held
that section “3B1.4 was invalid to the extent that it applied to
criminals who committed their crimes when under the age of twenty71
one.” The Borkowski panel noted that this issue had split the Butler
panel and that the two-judge majority decision had rejected “the
72
cogent reasoning” of the lone dissenting judge. Gleefully noting that
73
three circuit courts had disagreed with Butler, such that the Sixth
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See id.
66. 21 F. App’x 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849–52 (6th Cir. 2000)).
72. Id. (citing Butler, 207 F.3d at 844–46).
73. See id. at 346–47 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–58 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 512–13 (4th Cir. 2001)). The assertion that the Eleventh Circuit had
disagreed with Butler on the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate a use-ofminor enhancement without an age restriction is inaccurate. As seen in Part IV.B., the
Eighth Circuit has also made the same erroneous assertion about the Eleventh Circuit. See
United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
McClain as support that the Eleventh Circuit, among other circuits, has concluded that the
Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority when the Commission determined
that section 3B1.4 applies to those under the age of twenty-one). In McClain, a case
involving adults who used a sixteen-year-old minor to cash counterfeit checks, the
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Circuit was “clearly in a minority,” the Borkowski panel applauded
the notion that the “clear circuit conflict” would ultimately have to be
74
resolved by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the panel’s obvious
distaste for the Butler decision, the panel in Borkowski nonetheless
75
acknowledged that it was “bound by the holding in Butler.” As such,
the court held that it had no choice but to “reverse and remand with
instructions for the district court to resentence in accordance with this
76
opinion and with Butler.” When the two-level enhancement is not
used in calculating Borkowski’s offense level, her sentencing range
dropped from between twenty-one and twenty-seven months’
imprisonment to between fifteen and twenty-one months’
imprisonment.
The precedential value of Butler is not as clear as the Borkowski
court believed. Instead, it is controversial, at least to me, to declare
that the Sixth Circuit actually held in Butler that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority when it promulgated section
3B1.4. Although it is true that two judges agreed with that conclusion
while one judge did not, all three judges on the panel agreed that
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement should not have been
applied to Retic because the prosecution had failed to prove that
77
Retic actually used a minor in committing the federal offense.

Eleventh Circuit did not actually address the issue of whether the Sentencing Commission
had acted within its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. See McClain, 252 F.3d at
1281–82. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit only focused on (1) whether section 3B1.4 contains
a scienter requirement, i.e., whether the defendant knew that he was using a minor, and (2)
“whether section 3B1.4 applies to the jointly undertaken criminal activity of coconspirators.” Id. at 1284–88. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the court seemed to actually
dismiss the idea that Congress intended to support the Sentencing Commission’s
broadening of the use-of-minor enhancement to include every defendant, regardless of
age:
Ideally, broad application of section 3B1.4 will deter adult criminals from
committing crimes with even those persons who, although they are over the age
of seventeen, appear to be minors. We believe that a construction promoting this
broad deterrent effect, rather than one encouraging willful blindness, effectuates
Congress’s intent in enacting the sentencing provision.
Id. at 1286–87 (first emphasis added). This understanding tends to imply that the Eleventh
Circuit believes that section 3B1.4 is only valid to the extent that it applies to adult
defendants, and not to all defendants regardless of age. Regardless of one’s ability to read
tea leaves about the Eleventh Circuit’s presumed position on the section 3B1.4 issue, it is
impossible to firmly place the Eleventh Circuit on either side of this debate.
74. See Borkowski, 21 F. App’x at 347.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 846–49 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
Judges Jones and Cole concurred “in the judgment announced by Judge Clay, and with
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Because the panel unanimously held that the district court had
erroneously applied a use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4,
there was no reason to seek a point of disagreement by addressing the
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4. The
split decision on the Sentencing Commission’s authority was arguably
unnecessary—why resolve a controversial, circuit-splitting, and panelsplitting issue when the resolution of the issue is not required to
decide the case? Had the Borkowski panel applied that line of
reasoning, it would not have been bound by the apparent dicta from
the Butler panel. Instead, the Borkowski panel could have addressed
the issue anew, giving whatever deference it wanted to the two
opinions emanating from the Butler panel. Given the rhetoric used by
the Borkowski panel, it is likely that the Sixth Circuit would not have
found itself as the lone dissenter on the section 3B1.4 issue. That
distinction would have been left for this Article.
Fortunately, there is one circuit opinion—the Sixth Circuit’s
fractured opinion in Butler—that creates a circuit split and lends
judicial support to this Article’s contention that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. As
with any legal conclusion, however, the persuasiveness of the
reasoning in reaching that conclusion is far more important than
simply looking around to see who else agrees with it (but it certainly
helps when impressive authorities agree with your reasoning and legal
conclusion). Part V of this Article will expound on the Butler court’s
reasoning and demonstrate why the Sixth Circuit—even though in a
clear minority among the federal circuit courts—correctly determined
that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional authority
and defied Congress’s intent by promulgating a use-of-minor
enhancement that made the age of the defendant entirely irrelevant.
B.

Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits Held that the
Sentencing Commission Acted Within Its Congressional Authority
in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without an Age Restriction

Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s conviction that the
Sentencing Commission failed to follow Congress’s directive, the vast
amount of judicial authority supports the Sentencing Commission’s
promulgation of section 3B1.4 in its expanded form. The Fourth,
most of Judge Clay’s well-reasoned opinion,” including Judge Clay’s opinion as it related
to the inapplicability of section 3B1.4 to Retic).

224

S OUTH T EXAS L AW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:205

Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that the Sentencing
Commission acted within its broad authority in promulgating section
3B1.4 without age restrictions for defendants.
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to hold that the
Sentencing Commission did not abuse its discretion in promulgating
section 3B1.4 to include all defendants, regardless of age, who use
78
minors to commit federal offenses. In United States v. Ramsey,
nineteen-year old Joseph Ramsey used his sixteen-year old brother to
79
sell crack cocaine to an undercover federal agent. After Ramsey
pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine, the district court applied a
two-level enhancement under section 3B1.4 for using a minor to
commit the federal offense and sentenced Ramsey to 121 months’
80
imprisonment. Even though Ramsey had failed to challenge the
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4
before the district court, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless felt
81
“compelled to address the validity of section 3B1.4.”
Rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Butler, the Seventh
Circuit held “that the Sentencing Commission did not abuse its
discretion when it promulgated section 3B1.4 to include all
82
defendants, regardless of age.” The court recognized that even
though Congress had directed the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate a guideline that applied to defendants twenty-one years of
age or older, the Sentencing Commission nonetheless eliminated the
age requirement altogether and made it “applicable to defendants of
83
all ages.” Setting the stage to explain its holding, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the Sentencing Commission “enjoys significant discretion
84
in formulating guidelines.” The court also evinced an understanding
that the Sentencing Commission’s discretion is not limitless: “Broad as
that discretion may be . . . it must bow to the specific directives of
85
Congress . . . [as reflected in] the statutory language.” With that
understanding of the scope of the Sentencing Commission’s discretion
to promulgate guidelines, the Seventh Circuit asked “whether the
[Sentencing] Commission obeyed the specific directive of Congress . . .

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 854–55.
See id. at 855.
Id.
Id. at 855–56.
See id. at 856.
Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377 (1989)).
Id. (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
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that an enhancement be applied to all defendants age twenty-one and
86
older.”
The Seventh Circuit first acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had
decided that section 3B1.4 could not be applied to defendants younger
than twenty-one years of age because the Sentencing Commission’s
total elimination of the age restriction constituted “a direct overruling
87
of an explicit Congressional declaration.” But the Seventh Circuit
did not see things as black and white as the Sixth Circuit did. From the
Seventh Circuit’s viewpoint, “the [Sentencing] Commission did
88
promulgate a guideline that encompassed the directive of Congress.”
According to the court, section 3B1.4 follows the congressional
directive that “defendants age twenty-one or older will receive a
sentence enhancement,” and that it “simply expanded the provision to
encompass a greater number of defendants” who are younger than
89
twenty-one. The Seventh Circuit opined that because the guideline
was not “at odds” with Congress’s directive, the Sentencing
Commission enjoyed the discretion “to enlarge the category of
90
defendants to whom” the enhancement would apply.
The Seventh Circuit then noted that the Sentencing Commission
is required to consider more than just Congress’s directive when
91
amending the Guidelines. The court explained that in promulgating
guidelines, the Sentencing Commission must consider a defendant’s
92
age, “the possible relevance of the proximity in age between the
93
offender and the minor(s) involved in the offense,” and how best to
94
ensure that sentences are uniform across the country. The Seventh
Circuit speculated that “[i]t is possible that . . . the [S]entencing
[C]ommission concluded that a nineteen[-]year old defendant” can
exert as much influence over and cause the same amount of harm to a
minor as a twenty-one year old defendant, requiring “equal
95
punishment” under the Guidelines.
The Seventh Circuit, however, did not view the validity of section
3B1.4 as an open-and-shut issue. The court acknowledged that section
86. Id.
87. Id. at 856–57 (quoting United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 850 (6th Cir. 2000)).
88. Id. at 857.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1) (2000)).
93. Id. (quoting the Crime Bill, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008(b)(4), 108 Stat. 1796,
2033 (1994)).
94. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994)).
95. Id.
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140008’s legislative history weakened the conclusion that the
Sentencing Commission obeyed Congress’s directive in eliminating
96
the age restriction. Providing a brief insight into the legislative
history behind section 140008 (which I will further illuminate in Part
V.B.), the Seventh Circuit noted that the congressional directive to
enhance the sentences for defendants at least twenty-one years old
originally emanated from the Senate version of the provision that
would have applied the enhancement to defendants eighteen years of
97
age or older. The court thus recognized that the Sentencing
Commission’s enhancement was broader than the congressional
98
directive, which was broader than the original Senate formulation.
That brief foray into legislative history did not dissuade the court from
holding that the Sentencing Commission had not overstepped
congressional bounds.
As a final leg of the decision’s foundational stool, the Seventh
Circuit spun the discussion from whether the Sentencing Commission
had exceeded its authority by failing to follow the congressional
directive to whether Congress implicitly ratified the Sentencing
Commission’s expansive guideline. Admitting that “it is possible that
the [Sentencing] Commission might not have given sufficient weight
to the congressional directive,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Congress had the opportunity to reject section 3B1.4’s “slightly
99
broader form.” Because Congress had specifically rejected some of
the guidelines that were proposed on the same date as section 3B1.4,
but did not reject section 3B1.4, the Seventh Circuit concluded,
“Congress implicitly accepted the [Sentencing] Commission’s
100
elimination of the age restriction.” Based on this reasoning, the
Seventh Circuit held, “We thus find that the Sentencing Commission
did not misread congressional intent, but rather was exercising
reasonable discretion in promulgating a guideline that reaches
101
defendants under age twenty-one.”
Not long after the Seventh Circuit split from the Sixth Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit lined up behind the conclusion that the Sentencing
Commission had acted within its authority when it promulgated

96. Id.
97. See id. at 857–58.
98. See id. at 858.
99. Id. (quoting Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts,
60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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102

section 3B1.4 without an age restriction. In United States v. Murphy,
eighteen-year old Demarco Murphy pleaded guilty to armed
103
carjacking offenses.
Imposing a two-level enhancement under
section 3B1.4 for using a minor to commit the offenses, the district
104
court sentenced Murphy to 221 months’ imprisonment.
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead in resolving the issue of
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its congressional
directive in expanding the use-of-minor enhancement for all
defendants, the Fourth Circuit concluded that because “section 3B1.4
is not at odds with Congress’[s] directive,” the Sentencing
“Commission did not exceed its authority in promulgating the
105
guideline.” Also noting that Congress gave significant discretion to
the Sentencing Commission to formulate guidelines, and recognizing
the Sentencing Commission’s expertise in sentencing matters, the
Fourth Circuit explained that courts must defer to the Sentencing
Commission’s interpretations of congressional directives if the
106
interpretations are not “at odds” with the directive’s plain language.
Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey, the Fourth Circuit
opined that “absent language in Congress’[s] directive limiting the
enhancement only to defendants [twenty-one] years of age or older,
section 3B1.4 is not at odds with the directive, and the [Sentencing]
Commission was within its discretion to broaden the category of
107
defendants eligible for the sentence enhancement.” According to
the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the plain language of the directive,
Congress simply intended to require the Sentencing Commission to
ensure that defendants at least twenty-one years old who use a minor
in committing a federal offense receive the sentence enhancement,
108
and the Sentencing Commission complied with this directive. The
Fourth Circuit explained that the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in
Butler “failed to appreciate that because Congress did not direct that
only defendants over age [twenty-one] receive the sentence
enhancement, it actually did not require the [Sentencing] Commission
to limit the application of section 3B1.4 to defendants of a certain

102. See United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 512.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 513 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2001)).
106. Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
107. Id. at 513 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853,
857 (7th Cir. 2001)).
108. See id.
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age.” The court was not the least bit concerned by the Sentencing
Commission’s decision to expand the scope of the directive to provide
110
the same enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age.
The Tenth Circuit further expanded the circuit split in favor of
concluding that the Sentencing Commission had acted within its
congressionally delegated authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. In
United States v. Kravchuk, Ivan Kravchuk was convicted of theft from
an automatic teller machine committed when he was eighteen years
111
old. To commit the federal offense, Kravchuk had used a “gang” of
112
minor coparticipants. At sentencing, the district court assessed a
two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section 3B1.4 and
113
sentenced Kravchuk to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment.
Kravchuk appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the
congressional directive does not authorize sentence enhancements for
114
defendants under the age of twenty-one.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit presented the issue as “whether
the sentencing enhancement under [section] 3B1.4 for use of a minor
should be applied to defendants aged eighteen to twenty,” even
though section 3B1.4 makes absolutely no reference to the age of the
115
defendant. The court briefly—and briefly might be a charitably
expansive term—recounted the decisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and
116
Seventh Circuits on the issue. Explaining that it must give “great
deference” to the Sentencing Commission, the Tenth Circuit stated,
“There is no direct conflict in the wording of [section 3B1.4] with
Congress’s directive that it apply to defendants age twenty-one and
117
over.” In addition to this singular statement on its rationale, the
Tenth Circuit also stated that it agreed with “the reasoning of the
118
Fourth and Seventh Circuits.” Citing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Murphy and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey, the Tenth
Circuit explained that those circuit courts upheld the validity of
section 3B1.4 because although “Congress certainly intended the
enhancement to apply to those over twenty-one,” the congressional

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See id.
335 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1152.
See id. at 1151.
See id. at 1158.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1158–59.
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“directive made no mention of any special policy for those under
twenty-one” such that the “directive then does not conflict with the
119
plain language of the guideline.”
The Tenth Circuit also relied on the Seventh Circuit’s
explanation in Ramsey that Congress had implicitly approved section
3B1.4 because Congress had an opportunity to review the guideline
and chose “not to modify or otherwise to disapprove of the
amendment extending liability for the use of minors to defendants
120
under the age of twenty-one.” The Tenth Circuit made no effort to
explain—or criticize—the Sixth Circuit’s contrary decision in Butler or
discuss the relevance of the legislative history behind section 140008.
Basing its decision mostly on the work of the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, the Tenth Circuit announced that it was joining its “sister
circuits in finding that the Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement under
[section] 3B1.4 for the use of a minor may be applied to defendants
121
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.”
119. Id. at 1158 (citing United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 512–13 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2001)).
120. Id. (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 858).
121. Id. at 1151; In 2008, the Tenth Circuit again confronted section 3B1.4’s use-ofminor enhancement, this time involving a defendant who began using his minor girlfriend
to commit a federal offense when the defendant was also a minor:
Defendant–Appellee Louiz Pena-Hermosillo started dealing drugs in 2001 at the
age of sixteen. Around this time, he began living with Ms. Janae Kelly, who was
twelve. She gave birth to Mr. Pena–Hermosillo’s child just after her fourteenth
birthday. She began to perform drug-selling activities a month before the child
was born, in April 2003. From that time until Mr. Pena–Hermosillo was arrested
two years later, Ms. Kelly sold cocaine and methamphetamine and made
between thirty and forty trips to Utah and an unstated number of trips to
Colorado to deliver money and retrieve drugs.
United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1109 (10th Cir. 2008). The defendant,
who “was three and a half years older than” his girlfriend, used her to make drug-running
trips since she was thirteen, and his use of her “continued for more than a year and a half
after his eighteenth birthday.” Id. at 1114. Confronted with the argument that section
3B1.4 does not apply to defendants under the age of eighteen who use minors to commit
crimes, the Tenth Circuit avoided the issue by explaining that “for more than a year and a
half, including most of the conduct on which the government relies, [the defendant] was
eighteen or older.” Id. at 1115. Notwithstanding the court’s holding that section 3B1.4
applies to defendants at least eighteen years of age, which simply followed circuit
precedent from Kravchuk, 335 F.3d at 1158 (holding that section “3B1.4 is valid as applied
to defendants aged eighteen to twenty”), the court curiously explained that “the three and
a half year differences in their ages is surely large enough to satisfy the nonproximity
requirement, if there is one.” Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d at 1115. Finally, the court pointed
out that “the defendant was a junior in high school when [his girlfriend] was still in seventh
grade,” which “is a large enough difference in ages to enable him to take advantage of
her.” Id. at 1115—16. Even though the Tenth Circuit simply followed circuit precedent in
holding that section 3B1.4 applied to a defendant at least eighteen, the court displayed
some concern that the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of section 3B1.4 without
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Last but not least, the Eighth Circuit expanded the circuit split to
four-to-one in favor of deciding that the Sentencing Commission had
acted within its congressionally delegated authority in promulgating
section 3B1.4 to apply a use-of-minor enhancement to any defendant
regardless of age. In United States v. Wingate, Peter Wingate pleaded
122
guilty to an armed robbery of a bank. As part of his robbery scheme,
Wingate enlisted the assistance of two minors, one age seventeen and
123
the other age sixteen. Even though Wingate was only eighteen years
old when he robbed the bank, the district court assessed a two-level
enhancement under section 3B1.4 for using a minor to commit the
bank robbery, which resulted in a sentence of seventy-eight months’
124
imprisonment. Wingate appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that
“the enhancement for use of a minor under section 3B1.4 exceeds [the
Sentencing Commission’s] authorizing legislation and does not apply
125
to a defendant under twenty-one years of age.”
Acknowledging the Sentencing Commission’s discretion and
sentencing expertise, the Eighth Circuit explained that “section
3B1.4’s wording does not directly conflict with the plain language of
Congress’s directive, which requires the enhancement apply to
126
defendants age twenty-one and over.” The Eighth Circuit concluded
that section 3B1.4 literally “encompassed Congress’s directive
because . . . defendants over age twenty-one will [still] receive the
127
enhancement.” In the court’s view, the expanded enhancement
under section 3B1.4 “merely extends the application to defendants
128
under age twenty-one.” Finally, the court reasoned that “[a]lthough
Congress stated the guideline ‘shall’ apply to defendants over twentyone years old, the guideline does not automatically exclude its
129
application to those under age twenty-one.” The Eighth Circuit
declared, “We join the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in holding

age restrictions might conflict with Congress’s directive. See id. at 1115 (“We need not
resolve whether [the] legislative history [behind the congressional directive that makes the
defendant’s age relevant] prevails over the plain language of the Guideline [which makes
age irrelevant.”).
122. 369 F.3d 1028, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion reinstated , 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir.
2005).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1030.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1031.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 858 (7th. Cir. 2001)).
129. Id.
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section 3B1.4 is not contrary to the Congressional directive, and
130
section 3B1.4 validly applies to defendants under age twenty-one.”
In an apparent mix-up in identifying recently decided circuit
precedent, another Eighth Circuit panel also fully addressed the
131
validity of section 3B1.4 just six weeks after Wingate was decided. In
United States v. Ramirez, Robert Ramirez pleaded guilty to
132
manufacturing methamphetamine when he was nineteen years old.
Because Ramirez had used several minors to commit the federal
offense, the district court applied a two-level use-of-minor
enhancement and sentenced Ramirez to ninety-three months’
133
imprisonment. Before the Eighth Circuit, Ramirez argued “that
because he was only nineteen years old at the time of sentencing he
was not subject to an upward adjustment for his use of minors to
commit a crime” because “the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
authority in its decision to apply [section] 3B1.4 to those under the age
134
of twenty-one.” Providing an extended recitation of the reasoning
employed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth
Circuit held “that the Sentencing Commission did not exceed the
scope of its delegated authority when it promulgated [section] 3B1.4
to include all defendants, regardless of age,” because section “3B1.4 is
135
not ‘at odds’ with Congress’s directive.” The Eighth Circuit had
(again) rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Butler and announced

130. Id. at 1032.
131. In United States v. Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit made the following telling
statement that indicated that the panel that issued the decision was apparently unaware of
the Wingate panel’s prior decision on the section 3B1.4 issue until the panel actually went
to issue its opinion:
We note that on June 2, 2004, another Eighth Circuit panel handed down an
opinion addressing this same issue. Our conclusion in the current matter is
consistent with the decision of the Wingate panel. When read together, the two
opinions thoroughly address this court’s position on the scope of the Sentencing
Commission’s delegated authority in relation to [section] 3B1.4.
376 F.3d 785, 788 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Had the Eighth Circuit panel in
Ramirez been aware of the Wingate panel’s prior decision, then the Ramirez panel would
have simply cited Wingate as controlling on the section 3B1.4 issue. The Ramirez panel’s
apparent mix-up in not identifying prior circuit precedent is telling in that two more federal
judges—the Ramirez panel of judges less Judge Heaney, as discussed in the text below—
lined up behind the viewpoint that the Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority
in making the age of the defendant and the proximity in age between the defendant and
the minor wholly irrelevant for federal sentencing purposes.
132. See id. at 786.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 787–88.
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that it had joined “the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth[,] and Eleventh
136
Circuits.”
In a companion case to Ramirez that relied on the holdings in
both Wingate and Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit again rejected a
challenge to the validity of the expanded use-of-minor enhancement
137
under section 3B1.4. In United States v. Harris, nineteen-year-old
Kody Harris used his seventeen-year-old girlfriend to purchase
138
substances used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Because
Harris had used a minor to commit a federal offense, the district court
applied a two-level enhancement under section 3B1.4 and sentenced
139
Harris to 188 months’ imprisonment. Noting that the Eighth Circuit
had already squarely addressed the validity of section 3B1.4 and had
held “that the guideline promulgated by the [Sentencing] Commission
is not contrary to Congress’s directive,” the Eighth Circuit affirmed
140
Harris’s sentence.
Had the Ramirez panel decided the section 3B1.4 issue before the
Wingate panel, however, the Eighth Circuit more than likely would
have joined the Sixth Circuit as having been unable to muster a
unanimous panel opinion. In a reluctant concurrence based on
binding circuit precedent, Judge Heaney separately wrote in Ramirez,
“I believe the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by
applying [section] 3B1.4 to defendants less than twenty-one years of
age because Congress directed that the enhancement should apply
141
only to those twenty-one and over.” For support, Judge Heaney
found persuasive the legislative history that Congress had “considered
and rejected a directive that would apply the enhancement to all
defendants eighteen and over, instead settling on one that would
142
apply only to those twenty-one and over.” Because the Eighth
Circuit had “decided [in Wingate] that the [Sentencing] Commission

136. Id. As explained in note 73, the Eighth Circuit’s proclamation that the Eleventh
Circuit had decided the section 3B1.4 issue is inaccurate. See supra note 73 (explaining how
both the Sixth Circuit in Borkowski and the Eighth Circuit in Ramirez erroneously assert
that the Eleventh Circuit has squarely addressed the issue of whether the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age
restriction).
137. See United States v. Harris, 390 F.3d 572, 572–73 (8th Cir. 2004).
138. Id. at 572.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 573–74.
141. Ramirez, 376 F.3d at 788–89 (Heaney, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 789 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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was within its authority to promulgate the enhancement as it is,”
143
Judge Heaney concurred.
C.

New York District Court Held that the Sentencing Commission
Exceeded Congressional Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4
by Making It Apply to Defendants Who Are Younger than the
Minors Used in Committing the Federal Offense

Of the five federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
whether the Sentencing Commission had the authority to promulgate
section 3B1.4 without age restrictions for defendants, all of those
courts confronted defendants who were not yet twenty-one years old
but were still adults over the age of eighteen. A federal district court
in New York confronted a case where the defendant was a minor
himself when he used other minors to commit a federal offense. In
United States v. Delarosa, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued an interesting unpublished
opinion that sentenced David Delarosa to 188 months’ imprisonment
for conspiring to distribute and possessing with the intent to distribute
144
heroin. As a seventeen-year old minor, Delarosa had assumed a
leadership role of a criminal heroin organization operating out of the
145
Bronx in New York. As a leader of this drug operation, Delarosa
employed numerous minor co-conspirators, many, if not all, of whom
146
were actually older than Delarosa. Apparently, Delarosa was able to
assume the leadership role despite his age because the criminal
enterprise had been “run by Delarosa’s father, uncles, and older
147
brother until their arrests.”
While prosecutors sought a two-level use-of-minor enhancement,
Delarosa countered that such an enhancement was inappropriate
“because (1) Congress did not empower the Sentencing Commission
to make the adjustment applicable to defendants who are themselves
under twenty-one years of age, and (2) because Delarosa was
148
apparently the youngest member of the conspiracy.” The district
court recognized that its appellate court, the Second Circuit, had “not
yet addressed the question whether the adjustment for use of a minor
143. Id. (citing United States v. Wingate, 369 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion
reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005)).
144. No. 04 CR. 424-1 (RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
145. See id. at *2.
146. See id. at *4.
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *3–4.

234

S OUTH T EXAS L AW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:205

should apply to cases in which the defendant is less than twenty-one
149
years of age.” The district court next acknowledged the federal
circuit split:
[T]he Sixth Circuit has held that the enhancement may not be
applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one because the
Sentencing Commission “failed to comport with a clear
Congressional directive,” . . . while the Fourth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits have concluded that the Guideline’s elimination
of the age requirement was a permissible interpretation of
150
Congress’[s] intent.
Although the district court found “the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning”
in Butler “compelling,” the court found it unnecessary “to choose
151
sides in this circuit split.” The district court deemed it significant that
the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits all “involved defendants who, though under the age of
twenty-one, were over the age of eighteen, and, even more
significantly, were older than the minors whose involvement provided
152
the basis for the enhancements.” According to the district court,
those facts “stand in stark contrast to the facts of [Delarosa’s] case,
involving a defendant who was a minor himself . . . and was apparently
153
younger than all of the other minors involved in the offense.”
Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey that “detailed
extensively” the Crime Bill’s legislative history, the district court
concluded, “Congress never intended the enhancement to apply to a
154
defendant who was younger than the minors he recruited.”
Explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s concern in Butler “that the
existence of an age differential allows an older, adult party to
155
influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous behavior” was
not present in Delarosa’s case, the district court held that applying
section 3B1.4 to Delarosa “would impermissibly conflict with a clear

149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. (citing United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2004), United
States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003), United States v. Murphy, 254
F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001), United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Although the Delarosa court never explicitly listed the Eighth Circuit as agreeing with the
Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, it cited the Eighth Circuit’s Ramirez case with its
cohorts. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58).
155. Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J.,
concurring)).
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156

congressional directive.” Based on this reasoning, the district court
did not apply a two-level use-of-minor enhancement to Delarosa’s
157
sentence.
D.

Sentencing Disparities Will Continue Until the Supreme Court
Decides Whether the Sentencing Commission Exceeded Its
Authority in Promulgating Section 3B1.4 Without an Age
Restriction

This Article contends that only the Sixth Circuit and the New
York District Court have correctly decided that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority by defying the clear congressional
directive to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement that made the
age of the defendant relevant for sentencing purposes. To be sure, the
issue of the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section
3B1.4 without age restrictions has vexed numerous courts and is still
alive and well. For example, in a 2010 case out of Iowa, twenty-year
old Travis Hawkins used a seventeen-year old minor to try to steal a
158
diamond ring in a nighttime robbery. Hawkins pleaded guilty to
possessing a sawed-off shotgun and a firearm with an obliterated
159
serial number in connection with the robbery. Applying a two-level
use-of-minor enhancement, the district court calculated a total offense
level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, leaving a Guidelines
160
range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. The district court
161
sentenced Hawkins to 121 months in prison. On appeal, Hawkins
argued that the Eighth Circuit should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s holding
in Butler “that the use-of-a-minor enhancement does not apply to
defendants who committed their crimes when less than twenty-one
162
years old.” Based on the binding precedent of United States v.
163
Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit rejected Hawkins’s argument.
The application of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement
significantly increased Hawkins’s punishment. If the two-level
enhancement had not been applied, Hawkins’s offense level would
have been 30. With an offense level of 30 and a criminal history

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
See id.
See United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 1043.
See id. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1048 (citing United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2000)).
See id. (citing United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2004)).
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category of I, the guideline’s sentencing range would have been
164
between 97 and 121 months’ imprisonment. As can readily be seen,
Hawkins was subject to two additional years in prison based on the
application of the use-of-minor enhancement. The proper resolution
of this issue matters.
Additionally, a recent case in Tennessee, which falls in the Sixth
Circuit, further revealed that federal courts are still struggling with
this issue, even when circuit precedent already controls the issue.
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Butler that section 3B1.4 cannot
165
be applied to defendants younger than twenty-one years of age, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
still apparently applied a use-of-minor enhancement to Edgar
Sanchez, who was eighteen years old when he used two minors to sell
166
drugs.
Until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split and decides
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement that made the age of a
defendant wholly irrelevant, sentencing disparities will continue to
exist for defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses
depending on where they commit the offenses. Additionally, federal
courts will continue to apply use-of-minor enhancements to increase
the sentences of defendants under the age of twenty-one (and even
under the age of eighteen, for that matter). By providing in-depth
analysis of the limited scope of the Sentencing Commission’s authority
to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement under the congressional
directive, this Article allows federal courts to adopt the no-authority
option by providing a strong analytical framework to ensure that only
adult defendants at least twenty-one years of age receive the use-ofminor enhancement.

164. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2011).
165. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849–51 (6th Cir. 2000).
166. See Brief of Defendant–Appellant at 8, United States v. Sanchez, 2009 WL
2390037 (July 24, 2009) (No. 08-6068).
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V. BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COMMISSION IGNORED A CLEAR
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVE AND DEFIED CONGRESS’S INTENT BY
ELIMINATING AGE RESTRICTIONS FROM THE USE-OF-MINOR
ENHANCEMENT, DISTRICT COURTS CAN UTILIZE THE NOAUTHORITY OPTION TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM
In deciding whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
congressional authority in promulgating section 3B1.4, courts must
first understand the nature and scope of the Sentencing Commission’s
authority. Congress created the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate guidelines to be used by district courts when sentencing
167
defendants convicted of federal offenses. Congress requires that the
Sentencing Commission only promulgate guidelines that are
168
“consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”
Federal courts have recognized that the Sentencing Commission
enjoys broad discretion in promulgating guidelines, even though such
a view was challenged shortly after Congress created the Sentencing
Commission. In Mistretta v. United States, a criminal defendant argued
that the Guidelines are unconstitutional because the establishment of
“the Sentencing Commission was constituted in violation of the
established doctrine of separation of powers, and that Congress
delegated excessive authority to the [Sentencing] Commission to
169
structure the Guidelines.” In holding the Guidelines constitutional,
the Supreme Court did not dispute that Congress had given
“significant discretion” to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate
170
guidelines. The Court made clear, however, that “the [Sentencing]
Commission is fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or
amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit either within the 180171
day waiting period . . . or at any time.”
Although Congress acted within its constitutional authority in
granting the Sentencing Commission significant discretion to
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2000).
168. Id. § 994(a).
169. 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
170. See id. at 377. John Locke expressed a different opinion in his Two Treatises of
Government:
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and
place it in other hands.
JOHN LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government § 141 (10th ed. 2005).
171. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393–94.
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promulgate guidelines, Congress did not bless the Sentencing
172
Commission with “unbounded discretion.” Indeed, the Sentencing
Commission must always “bow to the specific directives of
173
Congress.” To determine whether a guideline accurately carries out
congressional intent, courts must review the plain language of a
174
congressional directive; if a guideline is “at odds” with the plain
175
language, the guideline fails.
Importantly, in asking whether the Sentencing Commission
exceeded its authority in promulgating a guideline pursuant to the
plain language of a congressional directive, courts “do not start from
176
the premise that [Congress’s] language is imprecise.” The opposite is
true—courts must assume that when Congress drafts legislation,
177
“Congress said what it meant.”
Thus, courts must ask whether “Congress said what it meant”
when it directed the Sentencing Commission to provide an
enhancement for defendants twenty-one years of age or older who use
minors to commit federal offenses and to consider the proximity in
ages between the defendant and minor. Congress’s plain language
does not stand naked, however, as there are other indicators
expressing Congress’s intent. The plain language of Congress’s
directive, the legislative history behind the directive, and the context
in which the directive was created demonstrate that “Congress said
what it meant”—the age of the defendant who uses a minor to commit
a federal offense matters. Congress’s focus on age was not excess and
useless verbiage.
A.

The Sentencing Commission Performed Linguistic Gymnastics to
Conclude that the Congressional Directive’s Plain Language Was
Ambiguous as to Congress’s Intent to Make the Age of a
Defendant Relevant for Purposes of the Use-of-Minor
Enhancement

After reading Parts I through III of this Article, did you believe
that the Sentencing Commission complied with the congressional
directive to enhance the sentences of defendants at least twenty-one
years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses? Did you at
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997).
Id. at 757.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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least conclude that Congress intended age to be a relevant sentencing
factor for purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement? As you studied
Part IV’s discussion of the reasoning behind the decisions of the
federal courts that have addressed this issue, which were more
persuasive on the issue of whether section 3B1.4 is at odds with the
congressional directive? No matter where you stand at this point, this
part of the Article expounds on the reasons why the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating a use-of-minor
enhancement that makes the age of the defendant wholly irrelevant.
The first order of business is to compare the plain language that
Congress used to direct the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a
use-of-minor enhancement for defendants at least twenty-one years
old with the Sentencing Commission’s “slightly broader” guideline
that contains absolutely no reference to the age of the defendant.
Does the plain language used by Congress in its directive to the
Sentencing Commission reflect clear or ambiguous guidance on
Congress’s intent to make the age of defendants relevant for
sentencing purposes? If the answer is that Congress clearly intended
to make the defendant’s age a relevant factor in sentencing, then
section 3B1.4’s wholesale elimination of an age restriction is at odds
with the congressional directive. If, on the other hand, Congress failed
to demonstrate its intent to make a defendant’s age a relevant
sentencing factor, then the Sentencing Commission acted within its
authority in making the age of the defendant irrelevant for sentencing
purposes.
Congress explicitly directed the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate a guideline to enhance the sentence for defendants who
are at least twenty-one years of age who use minors under the age of
eighteen to commit a federal offense. Thus, Congress used age
restrictions twice in the directive itself, once to describe the age of the
defendant subject to the enhancement and once to describe the age of
the minor used in the offense. The ages of the defendant and the
minor are not the only examples of Congress’s plain language
expressing the importance of age restrictions. Congress also explicitly
directed the Sentencing Commission to consider the difference in the
ages between the adult defendant and the minor used. Admitting that
it promulgated a use-of-minor enhancement in a “slightly broader
form,” the Sentencing Commission eviscerated any age requirement
for defendants to receive an enhancement. Under section 3B1.4’s useof-minor enhancement, the age of the defendant is wholly irrelevant,
as is the proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used
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to commit the offense. The result is that every defendant—no matter
how old or how young—will receive the same two-level sentence
enhancement for using a minor to commit a federal offense. For
example, a forty-year-old adult who uses a seventeen-year-old minor
receives the same two-level enhancement as an eighteen-year-old
defendant who uses a seventeen-year-old minor who is two or three
days younger than the defendant. Did Congress intend that the ages
of these two defendants—and the proximity in ages between the
defendants and minors—would be wholly irrelevant such that each
defendant receives the same enhancement? Additionally, a defendant
who is the same age as—or younger than—the minor used will also
receive the same two-level sentence enhancement as a defendant who
is much older than the minor he used. Do these results comply with
178
Congress’s directive? Are they at odds with Congress’s intent?
In simply reviewing the plain language of the directive, federal
courts have been unable to agree on whether the Sentencing
Commission exceeded congressional authority in promulgating
section 3B1.4. On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit announced that it
could “not conceive of a clearer example than that presented here
where the [Sentencing] Commission has so flatly ignored a clear
[c]ongressional directive” as when it “simply removed the age
179
restriction . . . lock, stock[,] and barrel.” Importantly, the Sixth
Circuit was unanimous in concluding that the Sentencing Commission
had completely ignored a clear congressional directive, at least when
the three judges on the panel looked only at the plain language of the
directive. Even Judge Clay, in his dissent in Butler, wrote, “At first
blush, it appears . . . that Congress intended—and provided in
unambiguous terms—for sentence enhancement for solicitation of a
180
minor to commit crime [sic] only for defendants age 21 and older.”
And Judge Clay was hardly lukewarm in his conclusion that Congress
unequivocally and clearly directed the Sentencing Commission to
178. Consider the admittedly troubling crime of child pornography as a possible
illustration of comparing two defendants engaged in the same conduct to explore whether
Congress intended that both defendants would receive the same use-of-minor
enhancement. First, seventeen-year-old A uses his sixteen-year-old brother to tape sexual
relations between two minors. Second, fifty-year-old adult B uses a seventeen-year-old
minor to tape sexual relations between two minors. Assuming that both A and B
committed federal offenses and used minors to do so, did Congress intend that both A and
B would receive the same two-level sentence enhancement? Did Congress express its
intent that the age of the two defendants and the proximity in age between them and the
minors used should be irrelevant for sentencing purposes?
179. United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 850 (6th Cir. 2000).
180. Id. at 845 (Clay, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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enhance sentences only for defendants at least twenty-one years old,
proclaiming, “A clearer expression of congressional intent is
181
unimaginable.”
In addition to the Butler panel’s unanimous
conclusion as to the clarity of congressional intent gleaned from the
plain language of the congressional directive, Judge Heaney of the
Eighth Circuit also concluded that Congress’s intent was that only
defendants at least twenty-one years of age would receive a use-of182
minor enhancement. Finally, although the federal district court in
Delarosa deemed it unnecessary “to choose sides in this circuit split”
based on what the court deemed to be the unique facts of the case in
which the defendant was actually younger than the minors used, the
court still found “the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning” in Butler
183
“compelling.”
Four circuits, on the other hand, have reached the opposite
conclusion. The Seventh Circuit—later joined by the Fourth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits—concluded that Congress’s only expression of
intent was that defendants twenty-one years of age or older must
184
receive the enhancement. As long as the Sentencing Commission
promulgated an enhancement that ensured that those defendants
would receive an enhancement, the Seventh Circuit was content to
conclude that anything else that the Sentencing Commission did
would also reflect congressional intent. This conclusion encompassed
the Sentencing Commission’s ultimate expansion of the use-of-minor
enhancement to include every defendant, as opposed to defendants of
a certain age, regardless of the proximity in age between the
181. Id. Perhaps tellingly, a law student’s published comment on section 3B1.4
expressed a very straightforward reading of Congress’s intent to focus the use-of-minor
enhancement only on adults who corrupt minors: “In order to deter adult criminals from
committing crimes with the assistance of minors, the United States Sentencing Commission
adopted section 3B1.4 of the [Guidelines]. Section 3B1.4 is a sentencing enhancement
penalty for adults who use minors to commit a crime.” John J. DiChello Jr., Comment,
Crossing Textualist Paths: An Analysis of the Proper Textualist Interpretation of “Use”
Under Section 3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines for “Using” a Minor To
Commit a Crime, 107 DICK. L. REV. 359, 360 (2002) (emphasis added). Indeed, the most
basic reading of the plain language of the congressional directive cries out that Congress
focused its intent on enhancing sentences for adult criminals who corrupt minors by using
them to commit federal offenses.
182. See United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
concurring).
183. United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
184. See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001). Curiously, the
Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism that, without considering Congress’s failure to reject
the proposed guideline during the review period, the Sentencing Commission gave
“sufficient weight to the congressional directive.” Id. at 858.
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defendant and the minor. In a much more bold opinion on the scope
of the Sentencing Commission’s discretion to comply with the
congressional directive, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the only way
that Congress could have limited the Sentencing Commission’s
discretion was by using the word only in front of the age of twenty185
one.
There is no doubt that the Sentencing Commission complied with
the plain language of the congressional directive to the extent that
defendants who are at least twenty-one years old will receive a use-ofminor enhancement under section 3B1.4 (which all of them will).
Everyone can agree on that. It does not likewise logically follow that
the Seventh Circuit is correct in then concluding that stripping any
relevance of age is thus not “at odds” with Congress’s directive, such
that the Sentencing Commission enjoyed unbridled and limitless
discretion “to enlarge the category of defendants to whom” the
186
enhancement would apply.
Words must have meaning, and
Congress’s repeated references to age must be given effect.
Although courts undoubtedly must give some deference to the
Sentencing Commission as long as reasonable minds can differ on
congressional intent, no deference is allowed if reasonable minds
cannot differ. Instead of simply rehashing the arguments in terms of
section 3B1.4’s wholesale elimination of the relevance of a
defendant’s age, perhaps the issue can be enlightened by inverting and
testing it in changing circumstances to challenge the conclusion that as
long as a use-of-minor enhancement includes the group of defendants
targeted by Congress (i.e., defendants at least twenty-one years old),
then the guideline will not be at odds with congressional intent no
matter who else the enhancement captures in its net.
If the twenty-one year old age restriction and the age proximity
requirement used by Congress simply required the Sentencing
Commission to ensure that defendants at least twenty-one years old
received enhancements but in no way limited the Sentencing
Commission from abrogating any relevance of age, then the same
conclusion should result regardless of the ages that Congress actually
used to describe defendants or minors. Presumably, both ages either
matter or they do not. If the Sentencing Commission was free to
185. See United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Ramsey,
237 F.3d at 857). This concentrated and narrow reading of Congress’s plain language seems
to turn the tables on who is granting authority to whom, where the presumption seems to
be that the Sentencing Commission has boundless authority unless Congress tightly focuses
every word in its desire to limit the Sentencing Commission’s authority.
186. Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857.
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entirely delete the twenty-one year old age restriction and the
proximity in age requirement, then it likewise would have been free to
discard any other age restriction, as long as defendants over the age of
twenty-one were still given the enhancement. If the Sentencing
Commission had promulgated an enhancement for any defendant who
uses any person, regardless of age, to commit a crime, would this
guideline comply with the congressional directive? A few hypothetical
situations might clarify this point.
Assume that in carrying out Congress’s intent as seen in the
Crime Bill’s directive, the Sentencing Commission promulgated a useof-a-person enhancement instead of a use-of-minor enhancement.
This use-of-a-person enhancement applied a two-level enhancement
to any person who uses another person to commit a federal offense. If
an eighty-five year old resident of a nursing home used another
eighty-five year old resident of the nursing home to commit a federal
offense, should a two-level use-of-a-person enhancement be applied?
If the source of the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate
such an enhancement is the congressional directive to promulgate a
use-of-minor enhancement, it would seem laughable to conclude that
applying such an enhancement to an eighty-five year old person who
uses another eighty-five year old person followed Congress’s intent.
Simply brushing off this expansion of the Sentencing Commission’s
authority by saying that at least defendants over the age of twenty-one
who use minors under the age of eighteen would still receive a use-ofminor enhancement seems misplaced. But if the Sentencing
Commission has the authority to wholly discard the relevance of the
defendant’s age for purposes of the use-of-minor enhancement, then it
would seem likewise allowable for the Sentencing Commission to
disregard the class of individuals that Congress sought to protect—
minors—in order to protect everyone else. At some point, such
interpretations render Congress’s expressed intent meaningless and
allow for unlimited expansion of the Sentencing Commission’s
authority in the face of Congress’s limitations on that authority.
What if the Sentencing Commission had kept the age restriction
for defendants as directed by Congress (twenty-one), but had only
changed the age of the person used in the commission of the federal
offense? Assume that the Sentencing Commission had promulgated a
guideline that would enhance sentences for adult defendants at least
twenty-one years of age who use anyone under the age of twenty-five
(rather than minors under the age of eighteen) to commit a federal
offense. Undoubtedly, the entire class of defendants who use minors
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under the age of eighteen would still receive an enhancement. Is it fair
to conclude that Congress’s only intent was to ensure that this class of
defendants received the enhancement? What relevance, if any, should
be given to the age of the person used in the offense—in Congress’s
decision, minors—if the ages of the defendants and the proximity in
the ages between the defendant and the minor have been declared to
be absolutely irrelevant? Once courts conclude that Congress’s
references to the age of the defendant and the proximity in ages
between defendants and minors have no meaning—even though
Congress specifically used defendants at least twenty-one years old
and deemed as relevant the proximity in age between the defendant
and the minor—then the age of the person used in the offense
likewise could have no meaning. Thus, we would be led to believe that
even though Congress specifically sought to protect minors under the
age of eighteen from being used to commit crimes—as seen by
Congress’s references to minors four times in the directive and in the
directive’s title—the only true expression of congressional intent was
that any defendant who uses a minor would receive a use-of-minor
enhancement.
As another example, what if Congress had directed the
Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences for defendants at least
sixty years of age who use minors under the age of twelve and to also
consider the proximity in ages between the defendants and the
minors? According to the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, if the Sentencing Commission then promulgated the current
section 3B1.4 that applies enhancements to all defendants who use
minors under the age of eighteen years, that guideline would not be at
odds with the congressional directive. These circuit courts would be
required to reach that holding because (1) nothing in the directive
indicates that only defendants at least sixty years old should receive an
enhancement, (2) nothing in the directive indicates that only the use
of minors under twelve years of age should result in an enhancement,
(3) the guideline simply expands the class of defendants to whom the
enhancement would apply, and (4) the guideline ensures that those
defendants at least age sixty who use minors under the age of twelve
would receive the enhancement. Thus, even a fifteen-year-old
defendant who uses a seventeen-year-old minor would receive a
sentence enhancement. Would that result be at odds with the
congressional directive? Such results seem nonsensical given
Congress’s focus on the ages of adult defendants—sixty—and the
minors used—twelve. When you also consider that Congress

2011]

BUT I’ M NOT T WENTY - ONE Y ET

245

specifically directed the Sentencing Commission to consider the age
proximity between the defendant and minor, common sense seems to
dictate that grand legal analysis is not required to recognize that the
ages of the defendant and minor must remain relevant for purposes of
sentence enhancements.
Similarly, what if Congress had directed the Sentencing
Commission to enhance the sentence of any defendant who uses a
minor who is at least half the age of the defendant and further
instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider the proximity in
age between the defendant and the minor used when considering an
enhancement? If the Sentencing Commission then promulgated a
guideline like section 3B1.4 without any age restrictions for
defendants, the federal circuit courts that have blessed section 3B1.4
would be hard pressed to rationally explain why they would not be
bound to conclude that the Sentencing Commission again acted within
its authority. This result should follow particularly because all of the
defendants identified by Congress would still receive a sentence
enhancement and Congress did not sufficiently demonstrate that only
those defendants should receive an enhancement. But this leap of
faith seems to require a suspension of disbelief to pull off, let alone
the wholesale elimination of any critical legal analysis.
Even though changing the ages used by Congress seems
persuasive to show the unreasonableness of the Sentencing
Commission’s elimination of the relevance of Congress’s age
restrictions for defendants, we should return to the actual use-ofminor enhancement in section 3B1.4 and compare it to congressional
intent. Creating a few more scenarios might help determine whether
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement squares with Congress’s
directive. What if twins commit a federal offense on their eighteenth
birthday at the urging of one of them? As it turns out, the older or
first-born twin, T1, actually recruited the younger or second-born
twin, T2, to help T1 commit the offense. It also turns out that although
T1 was eighteen years old at the time that the offense was committed,
T2 was not technically eighteen because the crime was committed
after the time of T1’s birth but before the time of T2’s birth. Are the
ages of the twins relevant for sentencing purposes or did Congress
intend that T1 would receive a use-of-minor enhancement?
To press this line of reasoning further, what if a sixteen-year-old
defendant used a seventeen-year-old minor to commit a federal
offense? What if a seventeen-year-old defendant used a friend who
was a few days older to commit a federal offense? To further illustrate
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that the ages of the defendant and minor must be relevant, what if a
twelve-year-old minor used a seventeen-year-old minor to commit a
federal offense? Finally, in a scenario that reflects an actual federal
case that challenged section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under
the age of twenty-one, what if a seventeen-year-old defendant led a
group of older, but still minor, participants to commit federal
offenses?
In every one of these scenarios, numerous circuit courts would be
forced to conclude—or have already impliedly concluded—that
nothing in Congress’s directive to the Sentencing Commission
reflected its intent that these defendants should not receive a use-ofminor enhancement in the same way that older adults would. Indeed,
four circuit courts have already blessed the application of section
3B1.4—which makes the age of the defendant irrelevant—to
defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Once a
court blesses the Sentencing Commission’s authority to decrease the
age of eligible defendants by three years, it becomes a difficult
proposition to then determine at which particular age that discretion
ends.
The last scenario just described, as you may recall, recounts the
187
facts of Delarosa. In that case, the district court deemed it significant
that the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits all “involved defendants who, though under the age of
twenty-one, were over the age of eighteen, and, even more
significantly, were older than the minors whose involvement provided
188
the basis for the enhancements.” According to the district court,
those facts “stand in stark contrast to the facts of [Delarosa’s] case,
involving a defendant who was a minor himself . . . and was apparently
189
younger than all of the other minors involved in the offense.”
Admitting that the age of the defendant and the proximity of the ages
of the defendants and minors used must be relevant, the district court
refused to apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to this
190
young defendant. Given Congress’s commitment on three occasions
within the directive to make the defendant’s age a relevant sentencing
factor, the Delarosa opinion ensures that age remains a relevant
sentencing factor regardless of the Sentencing Commission’s decision

187. See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *2,
4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
188. Id. at *5.
189. Id.
190. See id.
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to eliminate its relevance altogether. The Delarosa court gave no
deference to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to enact a “slightly
broader” use-of-minor enhancement. Because the Delarosa court’s
analysis tracks Congress’s intent, it is difficult to criticize; instead, the
opinion seems inherently correct.
Tellingly, the Tenth Circuit might part ways with the Fourth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in cases like Delarosa that involve minor
defendants. Somewhat surprisingly and without authority, the Tenth
Circuit intimated that section 3B1.4 only applies to defendants who
are themselves adults, concluding that the Sentencing Commission
merely expanded the class of defendants from those over twenty-one
191
years of age to those at least eighteen. In Kravchuk, the Tenth
Circuit’s dicta that section 3B1.4 only applies to defendants at least
eighteen years old would prohibit a minor defendant like Delarosa
from receiving a use-of-minor enhancement. There is nothing in
section 3B1.4 that makes the defendant’s age relevant for application
of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement. Unfortunately, the Tenth
Circuit did not explain why the Sentencing Commission had the
authority to modify the twenty-one year age restriction for
defendants, but it nonetheless lacked the authority to make it lower
than the age of eighteen. At a minimum, the Tenth Circuit conceded
that the age of the defendant must be relevant for sentencing purposes
such that the Sentencing Commission acted without authority in
promulgating an enhancement where the age of the defendant is
192
wholly irrelevant.
191. See United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2003).
192. In United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, the Tenth Circuit conceded that there is
“some support in the [Crime Bill’s] legislative history for the defendant’s argument” that
section 3B1.4 should not apply to defendants who are minors who use other minors to
commit federal offenses. 522 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008). The court acknowledged
that the Sentencing Commission, in enacting section 3B1.4 pursuant to an express
congressional directive, “included neither an age limitation [for defendants] nor any
limitation based on proximity in ages” between the defendant and minor used. Id. But the
court also understood that “Congress took no step to override” the Sentencing
Commission’s decision to remove the relevance of the defendant’s age from the decision to
apply a use-of-minor enhancement. Id. Even though the court did not need to decide the
issue of whether section 3B1.4 applies to defendants under the age of eighteen because this
particular defendant used a minor when the defendant was over eighteen (but started using
the minor when the defendant was also a minor), the court still spent a few sentences
explaining that there was “a large enough difference in ages to enable [the defendant] to
take advantage of” the minor. Id. at 1115–16. Even though section 3B1.4 makes the age of
the defendant and the proximity in age between the defendant and minor used entirely
irrelevant for sentencing purposes, the Tenth Circuit again demonstrated that there is a
conflict between Congress’s focus on the defendant’s age and the Sentencing Commission’s
decision to make the defendant’s age absolutely irrelevant. No matter how much courts
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The Sixth Circuit spent some time developing the theme that
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to make age relevant
for sentencing purposes. Calling section 3B1.4 “far more dramatic”
than Congress’s directive, the Sixth Circuit predicted some of the
foreseeable consequences of the Sentencing Commission’s decision to
eliminate the relevance of age: “As this case demonstrates, without
the age limit that Congress originally authorized, the guideline
introduces a whole host of situations where defendants under age
twenty-one can receive enhancements for engaging in criminal
activities with youths of similar age, or perhaps even older than the
193
defendants themselves.” Describing Congress’s age restriction as “a
core aspect of that directive,” the Sixth Circuit explained that the
twenty-one year old age restriction played a bright-line role in
194
Congress’s directive. According to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
of congressional intent, Congress created the age restriction out of a
“concern that the existence of an age differential allows an older,
adult party to influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous
195
behavior.” This interpretation tracks the directive’s plain language
that requires the Sentencing Commission to promulgate an
enhancement for defendants at least twenty-one years of age who use
minors under the age of eighteen, and in doing so, to consider the age
differences between the two. As will be shown in Part V.B., this
determination that the focus of the directive is on minors who are
corrupted by adults is consistent with the legislative history behind the
congressional directive.
Words must have meaning, or else plain language loses its ability
to act as an indicator of intent. Courts engage in dangerous
interpretations of congressional intent when they conclude that
Congress’s words are ambiguous such that an agency like the
Sentencing Commission, which only gets its powers and authority
from Congress, has unbridled, bottomless discretion to eliminate
words altogether from legislation. Three times within the directive
itself Congress revealed its intent that age restrictions for defendants
were an important part of its contemplated use-of-minor
enhancement. Not only did Congress use the ages of twenty-one for
wish to defer to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to promulgate section 3B1.4 in a
“slightly broader form” without any age restrictions for defendants, courts still must
confront cases in which the age of the defendant seems to be a glaring and obvious factor
in sentencing, precisely as Congress instructed.
193. United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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defendants and less than eighteen for minors, Congress also made
clear that the age differences between the two classes were important
in meting out appropriate punishment. It is difficult to describe as
reasonable the Sentencing Commission’s decision to create an
enhancement that completely discards two of the three references to
age. The result was that the Sentencing Commission made the
considerations of a defendant’s age and the age differences between
the defendant and minor wholly irrelevant for sentencing purposes.
Given the directive’s plain language and considering the scenarios laid
out above, Congress intended that age can be, should be, and is a
196
relevant consideration in applying a use-of-minor enhancement.
As I conclude this part of the Article, I want to make clear that I
am not contending that the Sentencing Commission had only one
option—promulgating one use-of-minor enhancement for all
defendants at least twenty-one years of age. Admittedly, the
Sentencing Commission enjoys broad discretion when it comes to
setting national sentencing policy as long as it does not abuse or
exceed its authority by defying Congress’s intent. Consistent with the
congressional directive to ensure that the defendant’s age is relevant
for sentencing purposes, it might have been reasonable for the
Sentencing Commission to increase the level of enhancement for
defendants as the age disparity between defendants and minors
increased. For example, the Sentencing Commission could have
determined that a defendant at least forty years old who uses a minor
under the age of twelve should receive a greater enhancement than a
twenty-one year old adult who uses a seventeen-year-old minor.
Additionally, as long as the Sentencing Commission carried out
196. As can be expected from its title, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, prohibits age discrimination in employment. Id. § 623.
However, the ADEA does not ban all age discrimination; it limits protection to individuals
forty years of age or older. Id. § 631(a). In enacting the ADEA, Congress authorized the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to “issue such rules and regulations
as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out [the ADEA], and [to] establish
such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all provisions of [the ADEA] as it may find
necessary and proper in the public interest.” Id. § 628. Although this admittedly is an
apples-to-oranges comparison, no rational person could fathom the EEOC’s creating
regulatory rights by interpreting the ADEA in a way that would allow persons under forty
years of age to be able to claim age discrimination under the ADEA. Congress did not
need to say that only persons forty and older are given protection under the ADEA
because the words it used had already said precisely that. Given the Sentencing
Commission’s expertise in national sentencing policy and the significant discretion that it
enjoys in sentencing matters, however, this is absolutely an apples-to-oranges comparison.
But it nonetheless might illustrate that Congress’s words must be given effect when it
grants authority to a body with limited power to carry out Congress’s intent.
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Congress’s intent to make age relevant, one could expect the
Sentencing Commission to create increased enhancements based on
the age of the defendant (e.g., one-level enhancements for twenty-one
to thirty year old adults, two-level enhancements for thirty-one to
forty year old adults) or the proximity in age between the defendant
and minor (e.g., one-level enhancements for adult defendants over the
age of twenty-one who are within five years of the minor, two-level
enhancements for defendants over the age of twenty-one who are
between five and ten years older than the minor). It was
unreasonable, however, to eliminate the relevance of the defendant’s
age altogether.
197
As you reach this point in the Article, my goal is that your
willingness to defer to the Sentencing Commission’s decision to
eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age for purposes of applying
a use-of-minor enhancement has exceeded its logical limit (or is at
least seriously waning). But the ground on which to reject the
Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of section 3B1.4 has not been
fully traveled. In addition to viewing the explicit text of the
congressional directive to glean Congress’s intent, we also have at our
disposal the legislative history behind the directive, including the
context in which the directive was enacted. When the text and
legislative history are reviewed together, the small amount of daylight
that some see cascading upon the Sentencing Commission’s discretion
disappears entirely. The resulting conclusion is an unmistakable sense
that the Sentencing Commission’s decision to enact a use-of-minor
enhancement devoid of age restrictions for defendants took place in
utter darkness (i.e., without congressional authority).
B.

Legislative History Reveals that Congress Intended that the Age of
a Defendant Is Relevant for Sentencing Purposes to Ensure that
Only Adults at Least Twenty-one Years of Age Receive Sentence
Enhancements for Corrupting Minors

After comparing the plain language of the congressional directive
to section 3B1.4, you might find yourself agreeing with this Article’s
analysis and conclusion that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
authority in promulgating section 3B1.4. On the other hand, you may
also find yourself grudgingly conceding that because the Sentencing
Commission enjoys broad discretion in promulgating guidelines and
197. As all authors impliedly do, thank you for reaching this point of the Article!
Please continue reading.
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Congress was not crystal clear in demonstrating that only defendants
at least twenty-one years of age should receive a use-of-minor
enhancement, section 3B1.4 might loosely comply with Congress’s
intent. Obviously, you still must wrestle with the knowledge that the
defendant’s age is now wholly irrelevant for purposes of the use-ofminor enhancement. Was that Congress’s intent? Fortunately, we are
not left entirely to our own devices to simply parse words to glean the
intent behind the congressional directive. Clear, unmistakable, and
uncontroverted legislative history underscores the plain language of
the congressional directive to further reveal that age restrictions for
defendants are mandatory, not discretionary. When the congressional
directive’s plain language and the legislative history are viewed
together, it becomes apparent that Congress intended that only adult
defendants at least twenty-one years old who corrupt minors under
the age of eighteen would receive a use-of-minor enhancement.
Although the directive’s legislative history is not going to make a
dramatic entry into this argument, it is a persuasive piece of my
argument that might sway you closer to concluding that the
Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by not heeding
Congress’s intent that the age of a defendant who uses a minor to
commit a federal crime must be relevant in federal sentencing.
Federal courts have mostly avoided the legislative history behind
the congressional directive in determining whether the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in eliminating age restrictions for
defendants from its use-of-minor enhancement. Of the five federal
circuit courts that have addressed the use-of-minor issue, the Seventh
Circuit in Ramsey was the only court to really attempt to reveal
Congress’s intent by reviewing the congressional directive’s legislative
198
history. But even the Seventh Circuit made only a cursory pass at
the legislative history. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit recognized that
the age restriction in the directive actually became more restrictive as
the legislation made its way through Congress, since the restriction
originally applied to defendants who were eighteen years of age and
then was amended to only apply to defendants at least twenty-one
199
years of age.
Based on this realization, the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the legislative history made it more difficult to
200
conclude that section 3B1.4 complied with Congress’s intent.

198.
199.
200.

See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2001).
See id.
See id.
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In a classic example of how the same information can be
processed to reach a different conclusion, the district court in
Delarosa relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey that
“detailed extensively” the Crime Bill’s legislative history to conclude
that “Congress never intended the enhancement to apply to a
201
defendant who was younger than the minors he recruited.”
Explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s concern in Butler “that the
existence of an age differential allows an older, adult party to
202
influence a minor to engage in wrongful or dangerous behavior” was
not present; the district court held that applying section 3B1.4 to
Delarosa “would impermissibly conflict with a clear Congressional
203
directive.” In rejecting section 3B1.4’s application, the district court
in Delarosa was mostly influenced by the directive’s plain language,
but it was also convinced that the legislative history proved that
Congress never intended for defendants under the age of eighteen,
and younger than the minors used, to receive a use-of-minor sentence
204
enhancement.
In addition to the impact that the legislative history had on the
district court in Delarosa, Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit was also
convinced by the legislative history that Congress intended that only
defendants at least twenty-one years old would receive a use-of-minor
205
enhancement. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, Judge Heaney found
persuasive the legislative history that Congress had “considered and
rejected a directive that would apply the enhancement to all
defendants eighteen and over, instead settling on one that would
206
apply only to those twenty-one and over.” As acknowledged by the
Seventh Circuit, the district court in Delarosa, and Judge Heaney, the
legislative history behind the congressional directive provides strong
support for the conclusion that Congress intended that only adult
defendants at least twenty-one years of age should receive use-ofminor sentence enhancements.
Even though the legislative history behind the congressional
directive is vitally important in that it buttresses the congressional
intent gleaned from the directive’s plain language, it is not easy to
201. United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006) (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58).
202. Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000)).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
concurring).
206. See id. at 789 (citing Ramsey, 237 F.3d at 857–58).
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track. The reason that it is challenging to uncover the legislative
history is because the congressional directive to promulgate a use-ofminor enhancement was only a small piece of a massive piece of
omnibus legislation. To be sure, the congressional directive’s
legislative history is somewhat mired in the murk of a confusing
legislative process that was used to pass the gigantic Crime Bill. Once
discovered, however, the legislative history uniquely and persuasively
informs us on congressional intent as to the relevance of a defendant’s
age.
How did Congress come upon the idea to direct the Sentencing
Commission to enhance sentences for adult defendants who use
minors to commit federal offenses? As discussed in Part II, Congress
used the Crime Bill to direct the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement. On October 26, 1993,
Congressman Brooks of Texas started the ball rolling by introducing
House Bill 3131, the U.S. House of Representatives’ version of the
207
Crime Bill. On November 1, Senator Biden of Delaware introduced
208
Senate Bill 1607, the Senate’s version of the Crime Bill. Neither of
the original versions of the Crime Bill contained a directive to the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement.
209
On November 3, the House passed its version of the Crime Bill.
On November 10, after a few weeks of activity on the Crime Bill
during that session, Senator Pressler of South Dakota offered
Amendment 1170 to Senate Bill 1607, which contained, for the first
time, a directive to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use210
of-minor enhancement. On November 11, Amendment 1170 passed
211
by voice vote and became section 5130 of the Senate’s Crime Bill.
Amendment 1170 mostly tracks the actual language that was
eventually passed in section 140008 of the Crime Bill. The only major
difference—but critical at that—between the final legislation and the
original amendment is that Amendment 1170 directed the Sentencing
Commission to enhance sentences for defendants at least eighteen

207. See 139 CONG. REC. E2532 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Hon. Jack
Brooks).
208. See 139 CONG. REC. S14774 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1993) (statement of Sen. Joe
Biden).
209. See 139 CONG. REC. H8723 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103–
324 (1993).
210. See 139 CONG. REC. S15644–46 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Larry Pressler).
211. See 139 CONG. REC. S17095, S17191 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
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years of age who use minors under the age of eighteen to commit
212
federal offenses.
It is important to understand that the original amendment
focused on adults at least eighteen years old, while the final version
applied only to adults at least twenty-one years old. In addition to
understanding that the age for defendants subject to an enhancement
increased, it is equally important to review the policy reasons given by
the directive’s sponsor. Showing concern over “the rising wave of
juvenile violence,” Senator Pressler explained that he offered the
directive to address “particularly heinous circumstance[s] of an adult
213
criminal using children to commit their crimes.” Believing that the
directive was “simple and straightforward,” Senator Pressler
reiterated that all that is involved with the directive is the following
principle: “If an adult uses a child under 18 years of age to commit a
[f]ederal offense,” then that adult must be subjected to heightened
214
punishment.
Senator Pressler further explained that the directive targeted two
215
types of crimes. First, the directive targeted gang crimes. Stating that
“[g]ang violence is rising as fast as the age of gang members is
declining” and that gang crime has grown increasingly more
sophisticated and complex, Senator Pressler explained that “young
gang members do not have the knowledge and experience to pull off
216
sophisticated crimes.” To effectively pull off these sorts of crimes,
Senator Pressler explained, those young gang members “must be
217
taught—and they are—by adults.” The second type of crime
targeted by Senator Pressler’s directive was when adults enlist
218
children to commit bank robberies. Senator Pressler explained that
“some adults recruit vulnerable young kids, mostly drug addicts, and
219
[then] train them in the ways of crime.” Indeed, Senator Pressler
anguished that many young people are not “being recruited [by
adults] for the football or debating teams,” but they are instead being
“encouraged by adults to join another kind of team—criminal
220
gangs.”
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See 139 CONG. REC. S15644 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993).
Id. (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at S15645.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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When illustrating how the directive should be applied, Senator
Pressler parsed no words in detailing how adults who use minors—and
certainly not minors who use minors—must be given longer sentences
than those adults who do not use minors to commit federal offenses.
For example, he said: “Any young person who has been solicited or
encouraged by an adult to commit a crime should know that the law is
221
on his side. With my amendment, the law will be.” Additionally,
Senator Pressler made clear that the directive focused on adult
defendants who corrupt minors:
Adults who use our children to commit crimes should be made
to pay—and pay dearly. They must be punished not just because
of the crime itself. They must be punished for attempting to
recruit and train the next generation of criminals.
Once children are turned down the path of crime and violence,
222
it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to turn them away.
After making his impassioned plea to protect America’s youth
against recruitment by adults to commit federal crimes, Senator
Pressler offered a New York Times article supporting his position that
the use of minors by adults to commit federal crimes is a real problem
223
in America. The New York Times article tells a gripping story of
how “modern-day Fagins” are “training young boys . . . to invade
banks with automatic weapons, terrorize patrons and tellers[,] and flee
224
with money in high-speed freeway getaways in stolen cars.” With a
wonderful analogy to the fictional character, Fagin, from Charles
Dickens’s Oliver Twist, the New York Times article explains that life is
now imitating art, but at an alarming rate of growth of debauchery
225
and terror. The New York Times article quotes two assistant United
States attorneys who describe two notorious adult bank robbers as
226
“appalling corrupters of youth.” In eerie detail, the article depicts
how adult bank robbers recruit, train, and use minors to carry out
daring and vicious bank robberies with no regard for human life,
227
including the life of the recruited minor.
The congressional

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at S15645–46.
Id. at S15645.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
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directive’s focus is squarely spotlighted on older adult defendants
228
recruiting much younger minors into a life of crime.
On November 19, the Senate abruptly ended its progression of
Senate Bill 1607, voting to indefinitely postpone it, and instead
enacted the language of Senate Bill 1607, including Amendment 1170,
229
as part of the House’s Crime Bill, House Bill 3355. Also on
November 19, the Senate sought a conference between the House and
Senate to consider the different versions of the Crime Bill. After
months of activity on the Crime Bill that is irrelevant for our
purposes, on March 24, 1994, Congressman Bishop of Georgia voiced
his support for the Crime Bill that would, in his words, “increases
230
penalties for adults who employ children in their misconduct.” At no
point did a Member of Congress rise to voice his or her support for
enhancing sentences for young defendants who use other young
defendants to commit crimes.
When the Crime Bill returned from conference, the directive’s
age restriction for the use-of-minor enhancement had been raised
231
from eighteen to twenty-one. I cannot locate any references to why
228. The debate on the use-of-minor enhancement was not conducted in a vacuum.
The Crime Bill’s focus to protect children from adult predators also encouraged debate on
whether the United States Code should be amended to include stiffer penalties for adults
who use minors to commit federal offenses. When offering such an amendment, Senator
Seymour of California vividly explained why adults who corrupt minors by recruiting them
into a life of crime should face stiffer penalties than other criminals:
[Y]oung kids are already being recruited as foot soldiers by adults with more
expansive organized crime activities, such as gambling, money laundering, and
extortion.
Sadly, rather than being recruited for football or the debating team, young
kids are being encouraged to join different kinds of teams—teams who believe
that the best offense is a good terrorist who can beat the competition with the
plunge of a knife or the squeeze of a trigger.
Those who recruit them, induce them, and coerce them must be held
accountable. They must pay and pay dearly.
And pay they will if my amendment is adopted. If an adult uses any kid to
commit any [f]ederal crime, he can expect to face a maximum 10-year sentence in
addition to other sentences that might be levied against him.
Kids are our most valuable, our most precious human resource. We have
heard the old axiom that children represent the promise of tomorrow. But in too
many cases, criminals see kids as a promise of future crimes committed.
137 CONG. REC. S8886 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. John Seymour)
(emphasis added).
229. See 139 CONG. REC. S16302 (daily ed. November 19, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Joe Biden); 139 CONG. REC. S17095 (daily ed. November 24, 1993).
230. 140 CONG. REC. E559 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Hon. Sanford D.
Bishop Jr.) (emphasis added).
231. See 140 CONG. REC. H8836 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (directing the Sentencing
Commission to “promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a
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the conferees raised the age restriction; I also cannot locate any floor
speeches or conference reports that explain why Congress chose to
increase the age restriction for defendants who would receive a use232
of-minor enhancement. It simply appears that during various
conferences in July and August 1994, the Crime Bill’s use-of-minor
directive actually increased the age restriction from eighteen to
233
twenty-one years of age, focusing on older adult defendants. On
234
August 21, the House passed the Crime Bill, followed by the
235
Senate’s passing of the Crime Bill on August 25. The President
signed the Crime Bill into law on September 13, 1994, at which point
the Sentencing Commission was directed to promulgate a use-of236
minor enhancement.

defendant 21 years of age or older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an
appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor in the commission of
the offense”) (emphasis added); see also 140 CONG. REC. H7442 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994).
232. See also United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Though we
found no discussion in the record explaining the change [from eighteen to twenty-one], the
eighteen year old formulation was eventually rejected in favor of the narrower
formulation. The final version of the provision, codified in Pub. L. 103–322, section 140008,
used the House’s twenty-one years or older formulation.”).
233. See generally 140 CONG. REC. S12283 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Slade Gorton) (“A proposal originally presented to the House of Representatives and
meant to be presented to the Senate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis has now, in fact, been
changed in a number of material ways. It is unfortunate that that crime bill, originally
reported from a conference committee, was written largely in secret by a small handful of
[m]embers . . . .”); 140 CONG. REC. E1738 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1994) (statement of Hon. Jim
Kolbe) (complaining that the legislative process used by the House of Representatives did
not give members “the opportunity to read and understand the crime bill before we vote
on it” because “[m]embers . . . had barely [six] hours to examine the 450-plus page
conference report which just appeared in the Congressional Record.”); 140 CONG. REC.
H5933 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Henry Hyde) (explaining that after
nearly three months since both houses sent their versions of the Crime Bill to conference,
the legislative process remained “in the deep freeze, frozen in amber, immovable,
intransigent. Nothing is happening . . . [except] one meeting of the conferees . . . . And then
it has been Death Valley. Nothing is going on that we know of . . . [except perhaps] stealth
meetings” not necessarily in “smoke-filled rooms, but they are going on behind closed
doors.”); 140 CONG. REC. H5934 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Bob Filner)
(complaining that although Congress sent the Crime Bill “to a conference committee on
June 16, the crime bill has been held hostage in committee for [thirty-four] long days”); 140
CONG. REC. H5935 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Hon. Betty McCollum)
(explaining that if there were negotiations on the Crime Bill by conferees taking place, “we
do not know what they are”).
234. See 140 CONG. REC. H2585–640 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (discussing and
ultimately voting to pass the crime bill).
235. See 140 CONG. REC. S12487–674 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (discussing and
ultimately voting to pass the crime bill).
236. See Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1539–41 (Sept. 13, 1994).
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It becomes abundantly clear from reviewing the congressional
directive’s legislative history that at no time was Congress concerned
about enhancing sentences for every defendant, regardless of age, who
used a minor to commit a crime. Instead, the directive’s purpose was
to enhance sentences for adults who use minors to commit federal
offenses, which could turn out to be recruitment to a larger life of
crime. Although Congress initially was confronted with a proposal to
direct the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a use-of-minor
enhancement for adult defendants at least eighteen years of age who
use minors who are younger than eighteen, this approach was
ultimately rejected in favor of focusing on older adults—those at least
twenty-one years old—who recruit minors into a life of crime by using
them to commit federal offenses. If various courts are correct in
concluding that the Sentencing Commission had the authority to
eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s age altogether, then it
apparently would not have mattered if Congress had openly debated
the age at which an enhancement should be applied, whether
eighteen, twenty-one, or even ninety for that matter. Not only did
Congress deem age a relevant sentencing factor, it stressed the
importance of an age differential between defendants and minors.
When this historical record is added to the plain language of the
directive that requires the Sentencing Commission to specifically
consider the proximity in age between the adult defendant and minor
used in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement, it becomes
attenuated to then declare that the only congressional intent that one
can glean is a desire that as long as defendants who are at least
twenty-one years old receive an enhancement, then every defendant—
no matter how old or how young—can also receive the same sentence
enhancement.
There is absolutely no indication—in the plain language of the
directive or in the legislative history—that Congress sought to
enhance sentences for defendants under the age of twenty-one who
use minors to commit federal offenses. Additionally, there is no
indication that Congress sought to ensure that defendants who are
themselves minors and use other minors—and perhaps even peers,
classmates, relatives, or friends—would receive the same sentence
enhancement as adult defendants who use minors to commit federal
offenses. Congress simply did not demonstrate that its concern was
the societal problem of minors using minors to commit federal
offenses.

2011]

BUT I’ M NOT T WENTY - ONE Y ET

259

It nearly defies logic to base a use-of-minor enhancement on the
foundation that young people are vulnerable, unsophisticated, and in
need of protection from predatory adults who seek to recruit minors
into a life of crime and then conclude, in the very same breath, that all
of those very same minors—the ones who apparently need protection
from adult recruitment because of various vulnerabilities—are also
predators from which other minors need protection. Because
Congress focused its directive on protecting minors from adults who
prey on children to commit federal offenses, it is unreasonable to then
conclude that Congress’s actual intent was that everyone who uses a
minor would receive the same sentence enhancement. Courts should
adopt the no-authority option to reject the Sentencing Commission’s
open defiance of congressional intent when it promulgated a use-ofminor enhancement where a defendant’s age is irrelevant.
C.

The Context in Which Congress Directed the Sentencing
Commission to Promulgate a Use-of-Minor Enhancement Further
Reveals Congress’s Intent that the Age of the Adult Who Corrupts
Minors Must Be Relevant for Sentencing Purposes

As the evidence of Congress’s intent to focus on adults who
corrupt minors mounts, the reasonableness of the Sentencing
Commission’s unsubstantiated decision to eliminate the relevance of
the defendant’s age diminishes. In addition to the directive’s three
references to the defendant’s age and the legislative history’s
passionate focus on protecting vulnerable minors from sophisticated
adult criminals, there is still more evidence that Congress intended
that only defendants at least twenty-one years of age would receive
sentence enhancements.
Another aspect of the congressional directive’s legislative history
is to place it in context of the Crime Bill itself. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, congressional intent can often be discovered by
237
viewing both the text and context of legislation. Are there any other
indicators within the same piece of legislation that created the
congressional directive to the Sentencing Commission that might
further express whether Congress intended that any defendant,
regardless of age, would receive a sentence enhancement or whether
Congress intended that only defendants at least twenty-one years old
would receive sentence enhancements?

237.

See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991).
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Title XIV of the Crime Bill, titled “Youth Violence,” contained
238
eight sections. One of these is section 140008, titled “Solicitation of
239
Minor to Commit Crime,” the congressional directive at the center
of this Article. Two other nearby provisions in the “Youth Violence”
section shed additional light on Congress’s intent in section 140008.
The first relevant provision is section 140001, titled “Prosecution as
240
Adults of Certain Juveniles for Crimes of Violence,”
which
amended 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to lower the age at which some defendants
241
who are minors could be prosecuted as adults in federal courts. This
amendment unmistakably demonstrates that Congress knew how to
communicate when it was dealing with minors and when it was dealing
242
with adults. Thus, sections 140001 and 140008 both focus on the
differences between adults and minors. Additionally, because
Congress decided in section 140001 to specifically deal more harshly
with certain identified minors in the criminal system, had Congress
wanted to continue that enhanced treatment of minors in section
140008, it would have done so explicitly. That is, Congress had already
considered enhanced punishment for minors in the same section of
the Crime Bill. A contextual reading of the two sections indicates that
Congress did not intend to enhance the sentences of minors under
section 140008’s directive to the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement. Instead, as Congress
transitioned from section 140001 to section 140008, its focus shifted
entirely from enhancing punishment for certain minors to protecting
minors from adult defendants at least twenty-one years old.
A second nearby provision that was part of the “Youth Violence”
section of the Crime Bill further demonstrates Congress’s intent to
treat adults who corrupt minors more severely than other defendants.
Section 140006, titled “Increased Penalties for Employing Children to
Distribute Drugs Near Schools and Playgrounds,” amended the
Controlled Substances Act to increase the sentences of adults “at least
21 years of age” who use minors “under 18 years of age” to distribute
243
drugs near playgrounds and schools. When Congress used the ages
of twenty-one and eighteen in section 140008, it was not its first
expression of intent to enhance punishment for adults who corrupt
238. See Crime Bill, Pub. L. 103-322, tit. XIV, 108 Stat. 1796, 2031–33 (1994).
239. Id. § 140008.
240. Id. § 140001.
241. See id.
242. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006) (authorizing prosecution of juvenile
offenders as adults for certain gang activity).
243. See § 140006, 108 Stat. at 2032; see also 21 U.S.C. § 860(c) (1994).

2011]

BUT I’ M NOT T WENTY - ONE Y ET

261

minors. Instead, it was part of a pattern of protecting children from
adults who would change the course of a young person’s life and
direct it toward crime.
Even though it might be true that some young people have the
potential to manipulate, coerce, and intimidate other young people,
Congress was not addressing that issue when it focused on adults who
corrupt minors. Significantly, when the Sentencing Commission
promulgated section 3B1.4, it did not provide a detailed analysis or
explanation of why minors (or even young adults under the age of
twenty-one) who negatively impact the lives of minors should receive
the same punishment as adults older than twenty-one who do so. This
is particularly so when you view Congress’s directive through a lens
with an indelible focus on adults at least twenty-one years old on the
one hand and minors under the age of eighteen on the other. The
Sentencing Commission simply mistook Congress’s focus and, by
doing so, defied Congress’s intent by eliminating the relevance of a
defendant’s age.
In addition to the congressional directive’s plain language and
legislative history that focus exclusively on the ages of the defendant
and minor used, the Sentencing Commission must also comply with its
own implementing legislation. In meting out the appropriate
punishment through the application of defendant-specific guidelines,
244
the Sentencing Commission must consider the age of the defendant.
In establishing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines,
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider, among
other things, a defendant’s age, education, vocational skills, mental
and emotional condition, physical condition, previous employment
245
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties. In
carrying out Congress’s intent in promulgating a use-of-minor
enhancement, the Sentencing Commission provided no explanation as
to why the age of the defendant became a wholly irrelevant factor at
sentencing. Given Congress’s specific direction to focus on the ages of
the defendant and the minor, especially in light of Congress’s general
direction to also consider age and maturity issues, the Sentencing
Commission responded with its explanation that it was simply
promulgating a guideline in a “slightly broader form” than what
246
Congress directed.

244.
245.
246.

See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1) (2000).
See § 994(d)(1)–(8), (e).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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When a defendant’s age is no longer relevant for sentencing
purposes, the form of punishment morphs into something entirely
different than what was sought. One can imagine multiple scenarios—
including the facts of the cases that have challenged section 3B1.4’s
application to defendants under the age of twenty-one as well as the
hypothetical scenarios depicted in Part V.A.—that reveal vast policy
differences in sentencing defendants who use minors. On one extreme
is Congress’s approach that focuses on the age of the defendant and
the proximity in age between the defendant and minor; on the other
end of the spectrum stands the Sentencing Commission’s approach to
discard any relevance of the age of the defendant or the proximity in
age between the defendant and minor. Congress focused on particular
defendants; the Sentencing Commission focused on every conceivable
defendant. The Sentencing Commission’s approach is not a subset
within the congressional directive, nor is Congress’s approach simply a
subset of section 3B1.4. The two approaches are different approaches
that address different societal problems. For purposes of addressing
those adult defendants who prey on vulnerable young people to
recruit them into a life of crime, age matters. Because the Sentencing
Commission chose to ignore the relevance of age in punishing
defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses, it defied
Congress’s objective to focus on age.
Finally, on the same day that Senator Pressler offered his
amendment to the Senate’s Crime Bill that directed the Sentencing
Commission to adopt a use-of-minor enhancement for defendants at
least twenty-one years old, another amendment was offered that
sought to provide enhanced penalties for defendants who use minors
247
to make pornography that is imported into the United States. This
amendment lacked any age restriction for defendants—it did not
contain an age restriction for the defendant or reference the proximity
in age between the defendant and the minor used. Congress again
showed that it knew how to express its intent to enhance penalties for
persons without age restrictions. Congress also knew how to say what

247. See 139 CONG. REC. S15643 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (Amend. No. 1168); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 861 (2006) (making it unlawful for all defendants to use minors under the
age of eighteen in various criminal drug activity); United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279,
1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 21 U.S.C. § 861 is “similar in language and purpose
to” section 3B1.4).
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it meant when it came to a use-of-minor enhancement—the
248
defendant’s age matters.
D.

Inferring Congressional Intent from Congress’s Silence During the
Guidelines’ Review Period Involves No Legal Analysis,
Unnecessarily Expands the Sentencing Commission’s Power, and
Runs into the Political Reality that Members of Congress Do Not
Run “Get-Weak-on-Crime” Campaigns

After the Sentencing Commission presented section 3B1.4 to
Congress in a “slightly broader form,” Congress had 180 days to
review and reject the proposed guideline. Congress did not reject it.
Some courts contend that Congress thus ratified the expanded use-ofminor enhancement, impliedly revealing that it did not care whether
the age of the defendant was relevant at sentencing, as long as every
defendant at least twenty-one years old who used a minor to commit a
federal offense received a sentence enhancement. This after-the-fact
reasoning defies congressional intent as seen in the plain language of
its legislation and legislative history, wholly abandons any judicial role
in ensuring that a body of limited power like the Sentencing
Commission complies with congressional directives, and ignores the
political reality that sounding weak on crime rarely works out in
congressional campaigns.

248. In a case involving capital murder and a jury’s ability to consider youth as a
mitigating factor in sentencing (the defendant was nineteen years old), the Supreme Court
made the following statement about age:
Our cases recognize that “youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage.” A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions. A sentencer in a capital case must be
allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the course of its
deliberations over the appropriate sentence.
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 350, 367 (1993) (citation omitted). Although this
understanding of the innate differences between minors and adults is not on point to the
application of the use-of-minor enhancement, the Supreme Court recognizes that
sentencing minors and adults is not the same task that involves the same calculations and
serves the same purposes. This reflection on age fundamentally underscores Congress’s
directive to the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences for adults at least twenty-one
years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses and to consider the proximity in
age between the adult defendant and the minor used. It also underscores a major policy
distinction between enhancing sentences for adults over the age of twenty-one as opposed
to adults—or minors for that matter—under the age of twenty-one.
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In his dissent in Butler, Judge Clay was clear that he would have
concluded that the Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority
in promulgating section 3B1.4 if the only evidence of Congress’s intent
249
was section 140008. When focusing on the congressional directive’s
plain language, Judge Clay concluded that “Congress intended—and
provided in unambiguous terms—for sentence enhancement for
solicitation of a minor to commit crime only for defendants age 21 and
250
older.”
In Judge Clay’s opinion, it was “unimaginable” that
Congress could have shown a “clearer expression of congressional
intent” than it did in directing the Sentencing Commission to enhance
sentences only for defendants at least twenty-one years old who use
251
minors to commit federal offenses. Judge Clay was not persuaded,
however, that Congress had expressed its intent only by the words it
used. Judge Clay believed that the best expression of Congress’s
intent was not its legislative directive; instead, Congress’s intent was
best discovered by how it reacted to the Sentencing Commission’s
submission of a guideline that admittedly was in a “slightly broader
252
form.” Judge Clay was persuaded that because Congress did not
reject the use-of-minor enhancement devoid of age restrictions, while
rejecting other proposed guidelines, “Congress, in effect, approved of
[the enhancement] as an appropriate reflection of its policy on the
253
sentencing of those who involved minors in their crimes.”
Explaining that Congress had “disapproved of a proposed amendment
that would have eliminated the 100:1 sentencing ratio that treats one
who deals in a given quantity of crack cocaine the same as it treats one
who deals in 100 times as much powder cocaine,” Judge Clay thus
extrapolated Congress’s intent from its failure to reject an expanded
254
use-of-minor enhancement.
Even though Judge Clay deemed it obvious that “the initial intent
of Congress” was to limit the enhancement only to defendants at least
twenty-one years old, he nonetheless concluded “that the intent of
Congress changed” when “Congress ultimately failed to express
disagreement with expansion of the enhancement to include

249. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 844–46 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J.,
dissenting).
250. Id. at 845 (emphases added).
251. See id.
252. See id. at 844–45.
253. Id. at 846.
254. Id. at 845 n.1 (citing United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir.
1997)).
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defendants” of every age. Judge Clay does not stand alone in
adopting this changed intent theory. The Seventh Circuit in Ramsey
picked up on Judge Clay’s reasoning and also concluded that because
Congress had rejected some guidelines but not the expanded use-ofminor enhancement, Congress implicitly ratified the Sentencing
256
Commission’s wholesale elimination of the age restriction.
Instead of focusing on Congress’s intent from the plain language
of the directive or its legislative history, the changed-intent approach
discounts the relevance of what Congress said and did at the time it
enacted legislation, and chooses to focus on what Congress did not do
and did not say at some distant future time. This changed intent
theory claims that Congress’s intent is not discovered through a
rigorous review of the language it used or the legislative history;
rather, intent can be gleaned from a failure to act, despite what the
rigorous review concluded.
This after-the-fact changed-intent theory can render
congressional language meaningless. What if Congress had directed
the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences “for only
defendants who are at least twenty-one years of age,” but the
Sentencing Commission nonetheless promulgated the section 3B1.4
enhancement for all defendants, regardless of age? According to
Judge Clay, that is precisely what took place here. Judge Clay
concluded that the plain language of the congressional directive was
unmistakably clear that Congress intended that only defendants at
least twenty-one years old would receive use-of-minor
257
enhancements. He nonetheless was convinced that Congress’s intent
was not shown through the plain and unmistakable language of the
directive, but it was displayed by Congress rejecting some guidelines
258
while not rejecting the expanded use-of-minor enhancement. Judge
Clay was not persuaded by Congress’s language; he was persuaded by
Congress’s silence.
When determining congressional intent, silence should not have
such a deafening effect on actual words and positive action. The
Supreme Court has cautioned against just this type of after-the-fact
discovery of congressional intent: “An inference drawn from
congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary

255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 846.
See United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Butler, 207 F.3d at 845.
See id.
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to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.”
As the Supreme Court has illustrated, basing congressional intent on
“congressional ‘silence’” could “render what Congress has expressly
260
said absurd.” When congressional intent can be determined by
legislation’s plain language, history, and purpose, federal courts—and
the Sentencing Commission—must give effect to that intent,
regardless of Congress’s failure to speak against a conclusion that
261
defies that congressional intent.
Speaking of absurdities, now assume that Congress had directed
the Sentencing Commission to enhance sentences “only, only, only,
only and only for defendants at least twenty-one years of age (and we
really mean only those defendants and nobody else)” who use minors
to commit federal offenses. Assume further that Congress later failed
to reject a use-of-minor enhancement that scrubbed any relevance of
the defendant’s age (i.e., section 3B1.4). Some courts would
apparently bless the Sentencing Commission’s expanded
enhancement and apply it to any defendant, regardless of age, because
Congress’s silence in failing to reject the expanded enhancement was
a better indicator of its intent than the unmistakable language it used
in directing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate an
enhancement in the first place. This changed-intent approach is
entirely backwards. Congress’s words—not just its silence—must also
be analyzed in determining congressional intent.
e Sixth Circuit likewise dismissed the so-called congressionalsilence theory (or as this Article calls it, the changed-intent theory),
reasoning that to accept it “would lead courts wholly to abandon their
role of assessing whether enacted guidelines comport with
262
[c]ongressional intent.” The Sixth Circuit explained that adopting
the congressional silence or changed intent theory “would thus dictate
that all enacted guidelines inherently satisfied [c]ongressional intent,”
because every guideline that goes into effect has gone through the
263
180-day review period without congressional rejection.
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning cannot be ignored. Because every
enacted guideline has survived the 180-day review period, the
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory would dictate that
Congress intended precisely what the Sentencing Commission

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991).
Id. at 137 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 137–38.
See Butler, 207 F.3d at 851.
See id.
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promulgated, regardless of what Congress said and did in directing the
Sentencing Commission to act. Instead of playing a crucial role to
ensure that the Sentencing Commission, a body with limited power,
complies with a grant of authority from Congress, the judiciary would
be relegated to courts without a purpose and without reason. The only
question under a congressional-silence or changed-intent theory
would be whether Congress rejected a proposed guideline from the
Sentencing Commission. If the answer to that question is no, then the
court must presume that the guideline satisfies Congress’s intent. Not
only is this approach not the law, it eliminates the role of the judicial
function to determine congressional intent, leaving that decision solely
to the Sentencing Commission.
One response to this rejection of the congressional-silence or
changed-intent theory might be that the 180-day review period plays a
critical role in ferreting out Congress’s intent. The argument is that if
Congress created the review period to give itself a chance to reject or
modify proposed guidelines, then Congress implicitly sanctioned the
Sentencing Commission’s authority to expand on congressional intent
if Congress does not expressly reject what the Sentencing Commission
does. This approach puts the cart in front of the horse. When the
Sentencing Commission acts under the specific guidance and authority
of Congress, it must follow congressional intent. To the extent that
congressional intent is unambiguous, the Sentencing Commission has
no authority to reject Congress’s intent. This would expand the
Sentencing Commission’s authority in the face of Congress’s
authority. Even though the Sentencing Commission has a fair amount
of discretion, that discretion cannot override congressional directives.
The issue of congressional intent should never boil down to an
analysis of whether Congress had the authority to reject a proposed
guideline, because Congress assuredly has that power (which it
granted to itself). It would be entirely nonsensical to create legal
principles that courts must apply to determine whether the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority if Congress’s intent can always be
determined simply by asking whether Congress rejected a proposed
guideline during the review period. The outcome of such an approach
would be to dismiss the significance of judicial review—in each case,
the only question would be whether Congress ratified the Sentencing
Commission’s work.
Instead of creating a judicial-review function that has nothing to
review, the issue in every case challenging the Sentencing
Commission’s authority to promulgate a guideline that is arguably at
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odds with congressional intent is to determine, in the first instance,
what Congress intended when it drafted a directive to the Sentencing
Commission. If reason dictates a conclusion that the Sentencing
Commission defied Congress’s intent, then the law requires a decision
that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority. The only time
that the 180-day review period should be relevant to determine
Congress’s intent is when a congressional directive is unclear and
ambiguous. Those situations should be the only universe in which the
180-day review period should be used as an after-the-fact ratification
process.
Again, the proponents of a congressional-silence or changedintent theory could argue that because Congress gave itself the
authority to review and reject proposed guidelines, then Congress has
elected to be bound by all guidelines regardless of Congress’s original
approach to an issue as seen in the language it used. Even if this
principle changed the judicial function in reviewing the Sentencing
Commission’s authority by only looking to see if Congress rejected a
proposed guideline, the principle’s real-world, practical application
may fall short. The politics of crime could impact how the
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory worked in practice.
The allure of the argument that Congress could have
demonstrated its intent by simply rejecting the Sentencing
Commission’s expansion of the use-of-minor enhancement to include
any defendant, regardless of age, may not carry much weight as a
political matter. It is a rare sighting, perhaps as rare as seeing Raphus
264
cucullatus, to see large factions of politicians arguing that criminals
265
should receive lighter sentences. The political drumbeat of being
“tough on crime” seems to support enhanced and longer sentences,
even if the drumbeat of such rhetoric fails to prove successful results
such as less crime, manageable court dockets, or effective prison
266
operations. During the debate of the Crime Bill itself, Senator
Simon of Illinois decried the political urge to “rush to be tough” on
crime, exclaiming that the Crime Bill rested “on the seductive belief
that we can fight crime simply by passing tougher and tougher
267
sentencing laws.” The policy concern that tougher sentencing laws
do not effectively fight crime is intensified when Congress not only
264.
265.

Raphus cucullatus is perhaps best known as the dodo bird.
See, e.g., Gary Heinlein, GOP Vows to Fight Granholm Sentencing Plan,
DETROIT NEWS, July 20, 2007 (describing a tough political battle for a governor who
wanted to lower sentences to save money in the corrections system).
266. See, e.g., Sound and Fury, STAR-LEDGER, May 5, 1996.
267. 139 CONG. REC. S16300 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
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chooses to enhance penalties for crime, but then the Sentencing
Commission doubles down to increase those enhanced penalties. By
forcing Congress to publicly fight against the Sentencing Commission
for less punitive sentences for criminals, the result might be
Congress’s unwillingness to engage in that debate. Thus, even in the
face of clear congressional intent based on a directive’s plain language
and legislative history, the Sentencing Commission’s ultimate
rejection of congressional intent in favor of enhanced penalties may
face little, if any, political resistance.
One very public display of the political get-tough-on-crime
mindset might be the nearly three-decade debate over the
reasonableness of imposing much harsher sentences for crimes
involving the same amounts of crack cocaine as opposed to powder
268
cocaine. Indeed, the so-called 100:1 crack–powder disparity resulted
in the same sentences for defendants convicted of drug crimes
involving cocaine who possess 100 times more powder cocaine as
269
defendants who possess crack cocaine. As will be discussed more
fully below, the Supreme Court has been forced to explain the
judiciary’s role in resolving the conflict between Congress’s intent to
maintain the 100:1 crack–powder disparity and the Sentencing
270
Commission’s desire to decrease the disparity. Although it is one
thing for the Sentencing Commission to seek to decrease penalties for
crime and face congressional rejection of getting weak on crime, it is
quite another scenario to reverse the roles and force Congress to
become the body that seeks to lessen penalties in the face of a
Sentencing Commission that seeks to enhance penalties. The political
realities of “fighting” crime might not allow this result.
A recent book argued that the political reality in the United
States (as well as in other western countries such as Britain, Canada,

268. See generally, e.g., Alyssa L. Beaver, Note, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing
Policy: Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (2010) (providing a history of the debate over the 100:1
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine). Please note that this Article has
no reason to take a position on the crack–powder debate. Because of the tremendous
amount of judicial resources devoted to that issue, however, the resulting decisions in those
cases illuminate the path for the proper resolution of the section 3B1.4 issue.
269. See id. at 2531.
270. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (addressing the public
debate between Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and federal courts over the
reasonableness of the 100:1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine and
holding that although federal courts must apply the Guidelines in sentencing, courts have
the discretionary authority to depart from the Guidelines based upon their disagreement
with the crack–powder cocaine disparity).
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and Australia) is that fear of crime and tough, punitive sentences
271
appeal to voters. More recently, the Economist issued its magazine
272
with the following cover: “Why America locks up too many people.”
The magazine’s editor claimed that “lawmakers who wish to sound
tough must propose laws tougher than the ones that the last chap who
273
wanted to sound tough proposed.”
Explaining that America
incarcerates one in one hundred of its adult citizens and has a total
prison population of 2,300,000, the editor maintained that the political
reality of crime is that “for the past [forty] years American lawmakers
have generally regarded selling to voters the idea of locking up fewer
274
people as political suicide.” There can be no doubt that more people
are being imprisoned these days. In the past forty years, the number
of imprisoned Americans has grown from fewer than one in 400 to
275
one in 100. According to another story in the Economist, American
“voters, alarmed at a surge in violent crime, have demanded fiercer
276
sentences,” and “[p]oliticians have obliged.” The story also depicts
the political difficulty in lowering the penalties for criminals: “Since
no politician wants to be tarred as soft on crime, such laws, mandating
minimum sentences, are seldom softened. On the contrary, they tend
277
to get harder.” An after-the-fact ratification principle that looks to
see if Congress reiterated its original intent by fighting the Sentencing
Commission to reduce punishment for criminals who use minors to
commit crimes is not an appealing option for judicial review of the
Sentencing Commission’s compliance with congressional authority.
Do not misunderstand the point of this argument. This Article is
not interested in debating the overall effectiveness of our criminaljustice system or whether it is too punitive. This Article also is not
taking a position on prison overcrowding or how minors should be
treated in our criminal-justice system. This Article does not bemoan

271. See generally JULIAN V. ROBERTS, LORETTA J. STALANS, DAVID INDERMAUR
& MIKE HOUGH, PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
272. ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010.
273. Rough Justice, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 13.
274. Id.; see also Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at
26 (“Justice is harsher in America than in any other rich country. Between 2.3 [million] and
2.4 [million] Americans are behind bars, roughly one in every 100 adults. . . . As a
proportion of its total population, America incarcerates five times more people than
Britain, nine times more than Germany and 12 times more than Japan. Overcrowding is
the norm. Federal prisons house 60% more inmates than they were designed for. State
lock-ups are only slightly less stuffed.”).
275. See Too Many Laws, supra note 273 at 26.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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the political notion of being tough on crime or using imprisonment to
punish criminals. Additionally, this Article does not even make a case
for treating minors as minors and adults as adults.
Instead, this Article focuses on the proper judicial role in
ensuring that the Sentencing Commission acts within its limited
authority under congressional directives. The political reality of crime
is simply being used to counter the alluring principle that the
congressional-silence or changed-intent theory ensures that
congressional intent can be gleaned by Congress’s failure to reject
proposed guidelines from the Sentencing Commission. When
presented with a proposed guideline like section 3B1.4 that enhances
penalties beyond Congress’s original intent, Congress may not have
the political ability to clarify its original intent. If courts then glean
intent from Congress’s silence and not from Congress’s language, then
that silence could be seriously and tragically misinterpreted. That is
the point. If this is true, then the congressional-silence or changedintent theory could have dangerous consequences in that Congress’s
intent cannot accurately be expressed by its silence; it is instead
subverted.
A major purpose behind the creation of the Sentencing
Commission, and thus the Guidelines themselves, is to “provide
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing [by]
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
278
conduct.” Expounding on this fundamental purpose, Justice Breyer
has explained that a “just legal system seeks not only to treat different
279
cases differently but also to treat like cases alike.” According to
Justice Breyer, “[f]airness requires sentencing uniformity as well as
280
efforts to recognize relevant sentencing differences.” Until the
section 3B1.4 enhancement issue is resolved, defendants who are
under the age of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal
offenses will continue to receive disparate sentences despite
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adults twenty-one and
older who use minors to commit federal offenses. To ensure that
278. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(1)(B) (2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2000) (stating that in
promulgating guidelines, the Sentencing Commission “shall promote the purposes set forth
in section 991(b)(1), with particular attention to the requirements of subsection
991(b)(1)(B) for providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted
sentence disparities”); see also Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 133 (1991) (citing S.
REP. NO. 98–225, at 49 (1983)).
279. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1252 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
280. Id.
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congressional intent is followed, district courts outside of the Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits should adopt the reasoning
of this Article and utilize the no-authority option. Even the circuit
courts which have rejected the no-authority option can revisit the
issue through en banc review. All of these courts should declare that
the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of the expanded use-ofminor enhancement defied Congress’s intent and should not be
enforced against defendants under the age of twenty-one.
The adoption of the no-authority option may simply exacerbate
the split of authority on the issue, however. This split may force the
Supreme Court to adopt or reject the no-authority option. Until the
issue is finally resolved (in favor of the no-authority option perhaps),
the Guidelines’ purpose in uniform and fair sentences will not be
achieved. The unfortunate result is that defendants in different
jurisdictions will continue to receive markedly disparate sentencing
reatment for the same conduct.
No matter the ultimate outcome on the no-authority option,
however, this Article explains that district courts have alternative
options on how to deal with the Sentencing Commission’s expansive
use-of-minor enhancement. District courts have the discretionary
authority to overcome sentencing disparities by rejecting section
3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one.
District courts have this authority regardless of the circuit split or
whether the Supreme Court resolves the split. Under an advisory
guidelines system, district courts now have tremendous discretionary
authority to escape the strictures of the no-authority option to
consider two other options to ensure that defendants under the age of
twenty-one do not receive use-of-minor enhancements. As explained
in Part VI, federal courts can adopt the policy-disagreement option or
the individualized-assessment option to carry out Congress’s intent to
apply a use-of-minor enhancement only to adult defendants at least
twenty-one years of age.
VI. ALL ROADS MIGHT STILL LEAD TO ROME: DISTRICT COURTS
HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE USE-OF-MINOR
ENHANCEMENT AS CONGRESS ORIGINALLY INTENDED BY
UTILIZING THE POLICY-DISAGREEMENT OPTION OR THE
INDIVIDUALIZED-ASSESSMENT OPTION IN AN ADVISORY
GUIDELINES SYSTEM
Although this Article concludes that the Sentencing Commission
exceeded congressional authority by promulgating section 3B1.4
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without an age restriction such that courts should adopt the noauthority option, that legal position is not the end of the road as far as
the issue is concerned. The issue of the Sentencing Commission’s
authority could become less relevant if district courts use their
significant sentencing discretion in applying section 3B1.4 of the
now-advisory guidelines only to defendants who are at least twentyone years of age. A brief introduction now to district courts’ discretion
on how to deal with section 3B1.4 might aid in digesting the extended
discussion below.
In a watershed sentencing case, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Booker struck down the mandatory nature of the Guidelines
281
as unconstitutional. The old mandatory sentencing regime fell to an
advisory sentencing system. In place of the mandatory regime that
existed at the time each of the circuit courts confronted the issue of
whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in
promulgating section 3B1.4, an advisory Guidelines system now exists.
Under this system, district courts must still consult the Guidelines to
calculate an advisory sentencing range. If the no-authority option is
adopted, the range will never include the use-of-minor enhancement
for defendants under the age of twenty-one. If the no-authority option
is rejected, then the range will include a two-level use-of-minor
enhancement for defendants under twenty-one. Once the advisory
sentencing range is calculated, however, district courts must then
consider all sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to
282
impose an appropriate sentence. The Guidelines’ range is simply
one factor among many that the district court must consider in
283
imposing an appropriate sentence, one that is not greater than
necessary to serve the purposes of federal sentencing. District courts
are thus freed from the constraints of the mandatory guidelines
regime, which in four circuits includes the mandatory application of
section 3B1.4 to defendants younger than twenty-one years of age.
District courts in every circuit are now free to look upon the
Guidelines’ range, which could include the application of section
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement if the no-authority option is
rejected, as merely advisory.
How will an advisory system impact the issue of whether district
courts must apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to
defendants who are not twenty-one years old? Under an advisory
281.
282.
283.

543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
See id. § 3553(a)(4)(A).

274

S OUTH T EXAS L AW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:205

system, district courts have two options to comply with Congress’s
intent of rejecting sentence enhancements for defendants under
twenty-one years of age who use minors to commit federal offenses.
First, district courts can now make an on-the-record policy
disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s use-of-minor
enhancement that does not have an age restriction. I call this first
284
option the policy-disagreement option. In essence, the rationale for
the policy-disagreement option is that the Sentencing Commission
exceeded congressional authority by removing the relevance of a
defendant’s age in applying a use-of-minor enhancement. Another
basis for the policy disagreement is that the Sentencing Commission
has not demonstrated that it used its sentencing expertise to decide
that defendants under twenty-one years of age should receive the
same enhancement as defendants over twenty-one. Because the
Sentencing Commission did not expand the congressionally directed
use-of-minor enhancement based on its institutional strengths, little
deference is due the Sentencing Commission.
Second, district courts can make an individualized, case-by-case
assessment on whether applying section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor
enhancement to a defendant under the age of twenty-one would
produce a sentence in a particular case that is greater than necessary
to meet the purposes of federal sentencing. I call this second option
285
the individualized-assessment option. If a district court decides that
the use-of-minor enhancement will result in an excessive sentence,
then the court has the discretion to sentence the defendant to a belowGuidelines sentence.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker may moot—
or at least tamp down—the importance of the original debate over the
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate section 3B1.4’s useof-minor enhancement devoid of age restrictions. In jurisdictions that
adopt the no-authority option and conclude that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4
without an age restriction, the advisory Guidelines range for
defendants under twenty-one years of age will never include a twolevel use-of-minor enhancement. In jurisdictions that reject the noauthority option and hold that the Sentencing Commission did not
exceed its authority in promulgating section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor
enhancement (currently the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits), district courts must still apply the two-level use-of-minor
284.
285.

See discussion infra Part VI.B–C.
See discussion infra Part VI.D.
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enhancement to defendants under twenty-one years of age to
determine the appropriate Guidelines range. Under the now-advisory
sentencing system, however, those district courts are then free to undo
the effects of the misplaced application of section 3B1.4’s use-ofminor enhancement to younger defendants under the policydisagreement option or the individualized-assessment option.
A.

A Brief Tour of the Road from a Mandatory Guidelines Regime
to an Advisory Guidelines System: Welcome to the Land of
Booker, Kimbrough, and Spears

For nearly twenty years, district courts labored under a
mandatory Guidelines regime. That regime began to crumble in 2004.
In Blakely v. Washington, a case involving the State of Washington’s
version of sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court held that a
district court violates the Sixth Amendment by imposing a sentence
on a defendant that exceeds the statutory maximum of the offenses
committed based on the court’s, and not a jury’s, factual findings in
286
applying sentence enhancements under the Guidelines. As a base
matter, the Supreme Court observed, “When a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the
287
punishment,’ . . . and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Thus,
the Court held that parts of Washington’s sentencing guidelines were
unconstitutional to the extent that they deprived a defendant of his
Sixth Amendment right to “insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury
288
all facts legally essential to the punishment.” The Court tried to
make clear that its decision was “not about whether determinate
sentencing is constitutional, [but] only about how it can be
289
implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.” The
Court’s decision in Blakely—applicable only to a single state’s
sentencing scheme—was the first blow that would ultimately take
down the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing system.

286.
287.

542 U.S. 296, 298, 303–04 (2004).
Id. at 304 (quoting 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; OR, PLEADINGS, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 87 (2d
ed. 1872)).
288. Id. at 313–14.
289. Id. at 308.
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Later, in Booker, the Supreme Court confronted the mandatory
290
nature of the Guidelines in federal sentencing. Reaffirming that the
Sixth Amendment requires “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the Court extended its decision in Blakely to the
291
federal Guidelines system. In crafting the appropriate remedy to the
unconstitutional nature of the mandatory Guidelines system, the
Court severed the parts of the legislation that created the Guidelines
292
and those that made it unconstitutional. Once those unconstitutional
provisions were removed from the statute, the Court reasoned, then
the remaining sentencing system is constitutional, but it no longer
293
retains its status as a mandatory regime. Instead, the Court’s
decision to sever the unconstitutional parts of the statute rendered
294
“the Guidelines effectively advisory.” Under this system, district
courts must consider “Guidelines ranges,” but they are permitted “to
295
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.” The Court
declared, “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account
296
when sentencing.”
Although district courts are no longer
constrained by the mandatory application of the Guidelines, they still
must consult the Guidelines along with other sentencing factors to
297
determine the appropriate sentence.
Under the federal sentencing system, district courts must consider
the following seven factors under § 3553(a)—only one of which is the
now-advisory sentencing range established by the application of the

290. 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (“The Guidelines as written, however, are not
advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges. While subsection (a) of § 3553 of
the sentencing statute lists the Sentencing Guidelines as one factor to be considered in
imposing a sentence, subsection (b) directs that the court ‘shall impose a sentence of the
kind, and within the range’ established by the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific,
limited cases.”).
291. Id. at 244.
292. See id. at 245. Specifically, the Court excised 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and
3742(e), which collectively had the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 264 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5) (2006)).
297. See id.
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Guidelines—to determine the appropriate sentence for a federal
298
defendant:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
[G]uidelines—
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code,
subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by
act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under
section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised
release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into
account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing
Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p)
of title 28);
298. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) (“This Court’s remedial
opinion in United States v. Booker instructed district courts to read the United States
Sentencing Guidelines as ‘effectively advisory[.]’ In accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the
Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must
consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”) (citations omitted); see also Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to
consider when imposing sentence . . . .”).
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(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to
any amendments made to such policy statement by act of
Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
299
offense.
When considering the § 3553(a) factors, district courts are
instructed to only “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the sentencing system as
300
reflected in § 3553(a)(2).
This sea change from a mandatory regime to an advisory system
has sent ripples to every corner of federal sentencing. To this point,
only one district court has utilized the advisory nature of the
Guidelines to reject the Sentencing Commission’s expanded use-ofminor enhancement as it applies to defendants under the age of
301
twenty-one. Now, fertile fields exist to harvest such a result in every
jurisdiction. To this end, district courts would then apply use-of-minor
enhancements only to defendants at least twenty-one years of age, a
result consistent with Congress’s intent in the first place. District
courts would accomplish this result by adopting the no-authority
option, policy-disagreement option, or individualized-assessment
option.

B.

The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District
Courts to Adopt the Policy-Disagreement Option or the
Individualized-Assessment Option to Sentence Defendants
Without Applying the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines

It is uncontroverted that Booker’s drastic change to the federal
sentencing system is still being digested by the federal courts, with

299. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
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many challenging and nuanced issues being debated. One challenging
issue is how best to determine the extent of a district court’s authority
to reject a guideline based on the district court’s policy disagreement
with the Sentencing Commission over the wisdom of the guideline.
This part of the Article presses the issue on whether a district court
has the discretionary authority to reject the application of section
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants under twenty-one
years of age based solely on the court’s policy disagreement with the
Sentencing Commission, i.e., the policy-disagreement option. This
issue will take time to work its way through the federal sentencing
system. That is precisely what is required in our constitutional
republic. Hopefully, this Article will help light the path to the options
available to sentencing courts to reject the Sentencing Commission’s
expanded use-of-minor enhancement so that courts can impose
appropriate sentences on defendants under the age of twenty-one who
use minors to commit federal offenses.
In a recent dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court’s summary
reversal of a circuit court’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that it will take some time and effort before courts fully
comprehend how much authority district courts have in rejecting
guidelines based on policy disagreements:
[Our recent sentencing cases of] Apprendi, Booker, Rita, Gall,
and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to
digest over a relatively short period. We should give them some
time to address the nuances of these precedents before adding
new ones. As has been said, a plant cannot grow if you
constantly yank it out of the ground to see if the roots are
302
healthy.
This Article cannot guarantee that the roots will be healthy if a
district court adopts the policy-disagreement option by explicitly
acknowledging a policy disagreement with the Sentencing
Commission over section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under
twenty-one years of age. Nevertheless, this Article provides a
reasonable analytical framework based on Supreme Court precedent
that authorizes district courts to do just that.
After the Supreme Court decided Booker, one controversial issue
launched itself to the front of the debate. That issue was the extent of
a district court’s discretion under an advisory Guidelines system to
issue below-Guidelines sentences dealing with the disparity in the
302. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 268, 270 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(per curiam).
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federal treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. In
Kimbrough, the Supreme Court demonstrated that district courts have
the authority to grant downward variances from Guidelines’ ranges
based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing
303
Commission on the wisdom of an actual guideline. The Court
reached this decision in the context of the decades-long debate over
the 100:1 disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, which
results in the same sentences for defendants convicted of crimes
involving 1/100 of the amount of crack cocaine than defendants who
304
are convicted of crimes involving powder cocaine. As the Court
described, “[u]nder the statute criminalizing the manufacture and
distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the relevant
Guidelines prescription, [section] 2D1.1, a drug trafficker dealing in
crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100
305
times more powder cocaine.” As applied, if two defendants are
convicted of crimes involving the same amount of cocaine, the
defendant convicted of the crack crime would receive a sentence
“three to six times longer” than the defendant convicted of the
306
powder crime.
The defendant in Kimbrough pleaded guilty to crimes involving
307
crack and powder cocaine. Applying the advisory Guidelines, which
contained the 100:1 disparity for sentencing purposes, the district
court came up with a sentencing range of 228 to 270 months’
308
imprisonment. The district court concluded that the sentencing
range was excessive, such that any sentence within this range “would
have been ‘greater than necessary’ to accomplish the purposes of
309
sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” The district court
blamed this excessive sentencing range on the “disproportionate and
310
unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.”
Contrasting the crack–powder dichotomy, the district court explained
that had the defendant been convicted of crimes involving the same
amount of powder cocaine, the applicable guidelines range would
have been only 97 to 106 months, drastically lower than the range for

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91, 109–11.
See id. at 94–111.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
See id. at 91.
See id. at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93.
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311

crack cocaine. Deciding that the statutory minimum sentence, which
itself still reflected Congress’s bias against crack cocaine, was “clearly
long enough” to satisfy § 3553(a)’s purposes, the district court
312
sentenced the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that any sentence “outside the
[G]uidelines[‘] range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a
disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder
313
cocaine offenses.”
Disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
“that, under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines,
are advisory only, and that the [Fourth Circuit] erred in holding the
314
crack–powder disparity effectively mandatory.”
Although the
district court must consider the Guidelines’ range as one sentencing
factor, the district court may also conclude that a sentence within the
Guidelines’ range exceeds what is necessary under § 3553(a). Thus,
the Court held that when determining the appropriate sentence, a
district court has the authority to “consider the disparity between the
315
Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses.”
Even though the Supreme Court in Kimbrough held that the
district court’s rejection of a Guidelines sentence based solely on
policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission did not result in
an unreasonable sentence, the Court nonetheless cautioned that such
policy disagreements should not result in a panacea to reject all
316
guidelines. The Court tried to tamp down any notion that the
317
Guidelines can be effectively discarded in a sentencing free-for-all.
The Court cautioned that although the Guidelines are only advisory,
the Sentencing Commission nevertheless plays a key role in
sentencing because of its capacity (which courts lack) to “base its
determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a
318
professional staff with appropriate expertise.” Furthermore, because
the Sentencing Commission serves Congress’s goals in formulating
and refining national sentencing standards, district courts are still
required to “treat the Guidelines as the ‘starting point and the initial
311. See id.
312. Id.
313. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006)).
314. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
315. Id.
316. See id. at 108–09.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 108–09 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir.
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)).
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319

benchmark’” at sentencing.
Thus, “in the ordinary case, the
Commission’s recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s
320
objectives.’”
The Court tried to boil down the analytical options when a
district court seeks to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines’
range:
In light of [a district court’s] discrete institutional strengths [to
judge a particular case and facts in light of the § 3553(a) factors],
a district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines
may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a
particular case “outside the ‘heartland’ to which the
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.” On the
other hand, while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer
review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from
the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the
Guidelines range “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a)
321
considerations” even in a mine-run case.
Thus, district courts have two options when sentencing outside
the Guidelines’ range based on the court’s conclusion that a
Guidelines sentence is not warranted under § 3553(a). First, a district
court can utilize the individualized-assessment option by using its
institutional strength to make an individualized assessment of what
sentence is reasonable for an individual defendant based on the
unique facts and circumstances of a single case. Second, a district
court can utilize the policy-disagreement option and infringe on the
Sentencing Commission’s institutional strength to make national
sentencing policy by disagreeing with the Sentencing Commission on
policy grounds, regardless of the facts and circumstances of a single
case.
The Supreme Court in Kimbrough blessed the district court’s use
of the policy-disagreement option. In doing so, the Court explained
that the district court’s downward variance from the Guidelines’ range
319. Id. at 108 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)).
320. Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)); see also Gall,
552 U.S. at 46 (“It is also clear that a district judge must give serious consideration to the
extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an
unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with
sufficient justifications. For even though the Guidelines are advisory rather than
mandatory, they are, as we pointed out in Rita, the product of careful study based on
extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing
decisions.”).
321. Id. (citation omitted).
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based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines’ crack–powder
disparity was warranted because even if the Sentencing Commission
had not changed the Guidelines, it had expressed its distaste for the
322
congressionally induced disparity. The Court applauded the district
court for explaining that it “accorded weight to the Sentencing
Commission’s consistent and emphatic position that the crack–powder
323
disparity is at odds with § 3553(a).” The Court indicated that the
district court had merely disagreed with the Sentencing Commission
in a case where even the Sentencing Commission itself disagreed with
the Guidelines, as seen by its subsequent act of reducing the crack–
324
powder disparity to between 25:1 and 80:1.
Given Kimbrough and the Sentencing Commission’s adoption of
guidelines with less than a 100:1 crack–powder disparity, what is the
authority of a district court under the advisory sentencing system to
issue a below-Guidelines sentence if the court adopts the
policy-disagreement option and disagrees with even a 25:1 or 80:1
disparity? In Spears v. United States, the Court again addressed a
district court’s policy disagreement with the 100:1 crack–powder
325
disparity and its impact on sentencing. The district court first
calculated the advisory Guidelines range—324 to 405 months’
imprisonment—for the defendant convicted of distributing crack and
326
powder cocaine. Based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,
the district court concluded that the Guidelines’ 100:1 crack–powder
327
ratio “yielded an excessive sentence.” Concluding that the 100:1
ratio was unjust, the district court recalculated the defendant’s
sentencing range to reflect a 20:1 ratio—a ratio the district court
favored for policy reasons—resulting in a sentencing range of 210 to
328
262 months. The district court then sentenced the defendant to 240
329
months in prison, the statutory minimum. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court, concluding that district courts are not

322. See id. at 109–11.
323. Id. at 111.
324. See id. at 106, 111.
325. 555 U.S. 261, 262 (2009) (per curiam).
326. See id.
327. Id.
328. See id.
329. Id. (citing United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (8th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter Spears I] (en banc), vacated, Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090, 1090
(2008)).
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authorized to simply substitute a new ratio for the Guidelines’ 100:1
330
ratio.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit, making
clear that the Court had held in Kimbrough “that district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine
331
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”
The Court specifically adopted the following language from the
dissenting opinion from the Eighth Circuit’s decision as a correct
interpretation of Kimbrough:
The Court thus established that even when a particular
defendant in a crack cocaine case presents no special mitigating
circumstances—no outstanding service to country or
community, no unusually disadvantaged childhood, no
overstated
criminal
history
score,
no
post-offense
rehabilitation—a sentencing court may nonetheless vary
downward from the advisory guideline range. The court may do
so based solely on its view that the 100-to-1 ratio embodied in
the sentencing guidelines for the treatment of crack cocaine
versus powder cocaine creates “an unwarranted disparity within
the meaning of § 3553(a),” and is “at odds with § 3553(a).” The
only fact necessary to justify such a variance is the sentencing
court’s disagreement with the [G]uidelines—its policy view that
332
the 100-to-1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity.
The Supreme Court reiterated that district courts have two
options when imposing sentences outside the Guidelines’ range. First,
the Supreme Court explained that a district court’s decision to vary
from the Guidelines’ range is entitled to great respect when the facts
of a particular case are “outside the heartland” to which the
333
Sentencing Commission intended the Guidelines to apply. In other
words, when a variance is based on the district court’s institutional
strength to make individualized assessments based on the unique facts
and circumstances in a given case, the level of deferential respect is
greatest.
Again,
this
Article
refers
to
this
as
the
individualized-assessment option. Second, the Supreme Court made
clear that an “‘inside the heartland’ departure (which is necessarily
based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily
330. See id. at 263 (citing United States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter Spears II] (en banc), vacated, Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090, 1090
(2008)); Spears I, 469 F.3d at 1174, 1176).
331. Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added).
332. Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Spears II, 533 F.3d at
719 (Colloton, J., dissenting)).
333. See id. at 264 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 89 (2007)).
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disagrees on a ‘categorical basis’),” rather than an individualized
334
assessment, “may be entitled to less respect.” Stated differently,
when a district court finds itself farther away from its institutional
strengths to sentence a particular defendant in a given case, and
invades the institutional strengths of the Sentencing Commission to
set national sentencing policy through the issuance of guidelines to
apply to all defendants, the district court’s national policy
determinations are entitled to less respect and some deference is owed
to the Sentencing Commission’s judgment. This is what I term the
policy-disagreement option.
The Supreme Court then addressed the level of respect afforded
a district court based on a specific policy disagreement with the
Sentencing Commission over the crack–powder disparity. The Court
explained that although a district court’s policy disagreement over a
guideline is generally not entitled to great respect, a policy
disagreement specifically on the 100:1 crack–powder disparity is
335
entitled to respect. The Court explained that because the disparity
emanated generally from Congress, and not the Sentencing
Commission’s institutional expertise, and, partly, because even the
Sentencing Commission itself had criticized that ratio, district courts
are actually not locked in a policy battle with the Sentencing
336
Commission. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized “district courts’
authority to vary from the crack[-]cocaine Guidelines based on [a]
policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a
337
particular case.” The Court made clear “that district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine
Guidelines [100:1 crack–powder ratio] based on a policy disagreement
with those Guidelines,” which “necessarily permits adoption of a
338
replacement ratio.”
After the Supreme Court’s approval of district courts’ authority
to categorically reject the crack–powder disparity based on policy
disagreements with the Sentencing Commission, it is now possible to
eliminate the crack–powder disparity altogether under the advisory
Guidelines system. District courts have begun to do just that. By
rejecting any crack–powder disparity on policy grounds, it needs to be

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 264 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added).
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stressed
that
district
courts
are
not
using
the
individualized-assessment option. Instead, district courts are using the
policy-disagreement option, which authorizes the courts to act as
policymakers in disagreeing with the Sentencing Commission on what
sentences best serve the sentencing policies in § 3553(a). In United
States v. Greer, for example, a federal district court in Texas
determined that the advisory Guidelines range for a defendant
convicted of distributing crack cocaine was between seventy and
339
eighty-seven months’ imprisonment. Based solely on a policy
disagreement over the disparity, the district court used the policydisagreement option to “adopt[] a 1-to-1 ratio for this and all future
340
crack cocaine cases in determining the base offense level.” When the
district court applied a 1:1 ratio to the facts of the case, the sentencing
range decreased substantially to twenty-one to twenty-seven months’
341
imprisonment. After considering the remaining § 3553(a) factors,
the district court settled on a sentence of twenty-four months’
imprisonment, nearly two-thirds less than the lowest end of the
342
Guidelines’ range.
Given the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Kimbrough and Spears, appellate courts would have little authority to
reject a district court’s adoption of the policy-disagreement option to
replace a 100:1, 80:1, or 25:1 sentencing disparity with a 1:1 ratio, at
least until the Sentencing Commission utilizes its institutional strength
to explain why the disparity should be given weight in mine-run cases.
To the extent that district courts and the Sentencing Commission have
a policy disagreement over an issue not within the Sentencing
Commission’s institutional areas of expertise, the Supreme Court will
not force district courts in an advisory sentencing system to defer to
the Sentencing Commission’s belief as to the appropriate sentences
under § 3553(a).
Why did this Article spend so much time explaining the policydisagreement option in the context of the crack–powder-disparity
debate? It is critical that district courts—as well as criminal

339. 699 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
340. See id. at 879–80.
341. See id. at 880.
342. See id.; see also United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644 (N.D. Iowa 2009)
( “[T]he appropriate method is to calculate the guideline range under existing law (i.e.,
using the 100:1 ratio and any appropriate guideline adjustments or departures), but then to
calculate an alternative guideline range using a 1:1 ratio, and to use or vary from that
alternative guideline range depending upon the court’s consideration of the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors to account, for example, for the defendant’s history of violence, the
presence of firearms, or the defendant’s recidivism.”).
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defendants and prosecutors—fully comprehend the sentencing
options under an advisory-Guidelines system based on policy
disagreements with the Sentencing Commission’s promulgation of
guidelines. The extent to which a district court may exercise its
discretionary authority to impose an outside-Guidelines sentence
based on policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission will
take time to sort out. But one thing is crystal clear: the Supreme Court
has concluded that a district court can choose to disregard the
Guidelines based solely on an ideological policy disagreement with
343
the Sentencing Commission. When district courts disagree with the
Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines based on policy grounds,
however, the Supreme Court has stated that the courts are not
entitled to great respect when they drift from their institutional
strengths and tread on the Sentencing Commission’s institutional
344
strengths.
As the Booker and Kimbrough line of cases show, the federal
sentencing landscape has undergone a dramatic pruning in the last few
years. Now that the Guidelines are merely advisory and district courts
have the discretion to impose outside-Guidelines sentences based on a
policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission or an
individualized assessment of a defendant’s unique circumstances,
district courts have significantly more discretion in deciding whether
to apply section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants who
are not twenty-one years of age. As explained in Parts II to V, a
district court’s first option is to conclude that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its congressional authority to promulgate
section 3B1.4 without an age restriction. Under this no-authority
option, the advisory Guidelines range will not include a two-level useof-minor enhancement. District courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits are foreclosed from choosing the no-authority
option, while district courts in the Sixth Circuit already operate under
such a framework. District courts in the remaining circuits that have
not addressed the issue are free to adopt the no-authority option,
which would mean that the Guidelines’ range for defendants under
the age of twenty-one would not include a two-level use-of-minor
enhancement.
C.

The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District
Courts to Utilize the Policy-Disagreement Option—Based Solely

343.
344.

See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam).
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on Policy Disagreements with the Sentencing Commission—to
Retract the Sentencing Commission’s Inappropriate Expansion of
Congressional Authority and Sentence Defendants Younger than
Twenty-One Years of Age Without Applying the Use-of-Minor
Enhancement
Every district court in every circuit has the authority to adopt the
policy-disagreement option, which decides as a matter of policy that
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement should not apply to
defendants under the age of twenty-one. In March 2011, the Supreme
Court decided Pepper v. United States, making crystal clear that
district courts have the authority to adopt the policy-disagreement
option:
To be sure, we have recognized that the [Sentencing]
Commission post-Booker continues to “fil[l] an important
institutional role” because “[i]t has the capacity courts lack to
base its determinations on empirical data and national
experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate
expertise.” Accordingly, we have instructed that district courts
must still give “respectful consideration” to the now-advisory
Guidelines (and their accompanying policy statements). As
amicus acknowledges, however, our post-Booker decisions
make clear that a district court may in appropriate cases impose
a non-Guidelines sentence based on a [policy] disagreement
with the [Sentencing] Commission’s views. That is particularly
true where . . . the [Sentencing] Commission’s views rest on
wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the
345
sentencing statutes Congress enacted.
What is the propriety of utilizing the policy-disagreement option
in section 3B1.4 cases involving defendants under the age of twentyone? As an initial matter, consider the Eighth Circuit’s pre-Booker
case of United States v. Wingate, which rejected the no-authority
option and held that the district court did not erroneously apply a
two-level use-of-minor enhancement for an eighteen-year-old
346
defendant. After the Eighth Circuit decided Wingate, the Supreme
Court changed the sentencing landscape by determining that a
347
mandatory Guidelines scheme was unconstitutional. As a result of
its decision in Booker, the Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s
345.
346.
2005).
347.

131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
369 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2004), opinion reinstated, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005).
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judgment in Wingate and remanded the case so that the Eighth Circuit
348
could consider Booker’s impact on the decision. On remand, the
Eighth Circuit reinstated its prior opinion and again affirmed the
district court’s application of section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor
enhancement to Wingate, even though the district court applied the
349
enhancement while the Guidelines were still mandatory.
In essence, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a sea change to an
advisory Guidelines system from a mandatory regime would not have
350
prodded the district court to issue a shorter sentence. Stated another
way, based on a plain error standard of review, the Eighth Circuit
required that Wingate establish that there was a reasonable
probability that the district court would have imposed a more lenient
sentence under an advisory Guidelines system than it did under the
351
mandatory regime. The Eighth Circuit concluded, “The record does
not indicate the district court would have given Wingate a more
352
lenient sentence absent Booker error.”
The Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion even though the
district court (1) ultimately sentenced Wingate at the bottom of the
Guidelines’ range, (2) complained that the court “wasn’t looking
forward to” sentencing Wingate, and (3) exasperated that “there is
not any good reason why” the court had to send a nineteen-year-old
353
person to prison for seventy-eight months. Notwithstanding the
district court’s equivocal statements about Wingate’s age and the
appropriateness of the sentence, the Eighth Circuit found solace in its
decision not to remand for resentencing by focusing on the district
court’s apparent fidelity to apply the mandatory use-of-minor
354
enhancement. In that light, the Eighth Circuit focused on the district
court’s (1) finding that it was “crystal clear” that Wingate had used
minors to commit a federal offense; (2) decision not to grant a
downward departure from the mandatory sentencing range based “on
the proximity in the ages between Wingate and the minors he used;”
(3) confounding statement—at least when used as support for the
notion that the district court would not have granted a shorter
348. See Wingate v. United States, 543 U.S. 1107, 1007 (2005).
349. See United States v. Wingate, 415 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2005).
350. See id. at 888–89 (finding no plain error in Wingate’s sentence that resulted from
the district court’s application of mandatory Guidelines because the district court would
not have imposed a more lenient sentence if given the opportunity).
351. See id.
352. Id. at 889.
353. See id.
354. See id.
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sentence if the Guidelines were merely advisory—that “the law is
what it is and the [G]uidelines, at least in [the district court’s] mind,
were clear as to what the penalty in this case is;” and (4) conclusion
that “both the Congress and the Sentencing Commission” treat
355
Wingate’s offense as serious.
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether the district
court would have used either the policy-disagreement option or the
individualized-assessment option (given Eighth Circuit precedent as
outlined above in Part IV.B., the district court would have been
foreclosed from considering the no-authority option) to impose a
below-Guidelines sentence for Wingate under an advisory Guidelines
system. Going forward, however, every district court (including the
district court that sentenced Wingate) has the discretionary authority
to reject section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement for defendants
under the age of twenty-one by utilizing the policy-disagreement
option or the individualized-assessment option.
How should a district court record its adoption of the policydisagreement option to reject the application of the Sentencing
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement to defendants under the age
of twenty-one? What explanation should a district court electing to
use the policy-disagreement option place on the record as the
rationale for imposing a below-Guidelines sentence for a defendant
under age twenty-one who uses a minor to commit a federal offense?
The district court should explicitly recognize that it has a policy
disagreement with the Sentencing Commission over the application of
section 3B1.4 to defendants who are not twenty-one years of age such
that applying the use-of-minor enhancement would not serve the
purposes of § 3553(a)(2). In other words, a district court should not
mask its policy disagreement as if it were using the individualizedassessment option on what would be a reasonable sentence for this
356
particular defendant. In exercising its authority under the policy355. See id.
356. In United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, the district court refused to apply section
3B1.4 to enhance the sentence of a defendant who used his minor girlfriend because the
defendant was a minor when he began using his girlfriend to commit federal offenses:
The spirit of the enhancement is to punish adults who exploit minors, and I don’t
feel that [the defendant] fits this mold, because his girlfriend was very close to
him in age and he wasn’t really exploiting her so much as he was misleading his
wife.
522 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008). When reviewing the district court’s sentencing
decision on the applicability of section 3B1.4, the Tenth Circuit explained that “it is not
clear whether the district judge concluded that, as a matter of law, the enhancement did
not apply under the government’s proffered facts” or, on the other hand, “if the ruling was
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disagreement option, a district court makes a policy determination
that all defendants under the age of twenty-one should not receive the
same two-level use-of-minor enhancement as defendants who are
older than twenty-one.
If a district court utilizes the policy-disagreement option to reject
section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one,
the court must explain why the Sentencing Commission’s
promulgation of the guideline will not carry out the purposes behind
federal sentencing. To do this, the district court must explain that the
Sentencing Commission’s expression of national sentencing policy
directly contradicts Congress’s expression of national sentencing
policy. Using the arguments in Parts II to V above, district courts
should explain why federal sentencing policy, as reflected in the
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, does not justify the same twolevel use-of-minor enhancement for every defendant, regardless of
age, and no matter the proximity in age between the defendant and
minor.
The district court should discuss the policy judgment of Congress
when it enacted the Crime Bill and included the use-of-minor
directive to the Sentencing Commission. Although the arguments on
Congress’s intent and the policy behind the use-of-minor
enhancement for adult defendants will be the same as those detailed
in Parts II to V, the effect of those arguments under the policydisagreement option is not that the Sentencing Commission exceeded
its authority (that is the no-authority option). The import of these
policy arguments is to illustrate that the district court is carrying out
congressional intent on the sentencing of defendants under the age of
twenty-one rather than the Sentencing Commission’s unjustified
approach. A district court utilizing the policy-disagreement option will

based on a factual finding.” Id. at 1115. Based on Tenth Circuit precedent holding that
section 3B1.4 can be applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one, district courts in
that circuit do not have the authority to adopt the no-authority option. Id. (citing U.S. v.
Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003)). In Pena-Hermosillo, the Tenth Circuit
also reversed the district court’s attempt to use the policy-disagreement option (or perhaps
the individualized-assessment option) to not use section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor
enhancement, concluding that “the district court’s alternative rationale [was] procedurally
unreasonable, because [it was] inadequately explained.” Id. at 1117. This holding
underscores how important it is for a district court to make a rational and detailed
explanation as to why the court is not applying section 3B1.4 to enhance sentences for
defendants under the age of twenty-one, whether based on the no-authority option, policydisagreement option, or individualized-assessment option. This Article strives to supply
that rational and detailed explanation to district courts for their use in sentencing
defendants who are not twenty-one yet.
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conclude that Congress’s approach to enhancing sentences only for
adult defendants over the age of twenty-one who use minors to
commit federal offenses better serves the sentencing purposes in §
3553(a) than the Sentencing Commission’s one-size-fits-all approach
to sentence every defendant—no matter how old or how young—by
using the same two-level use-of-minor enhancement.
A district court’s rejection of the Sentencing Commission’s
expertise on uniform national sentencing policy will not be entitled to
great respect if the Sentencing Commission utilized its institutional
expertise in determining that § 3553(a) requires that all defendants—
regardless of age—receive a two-level enhancement for using any
minor, even if the minor is much younger, barely younger, or even
older than the defendant. As seen in Kimbrough and Spears, the
Sentencing Commission loses its vaulted status as a body entitled to
great deference when it cannot show that its institutional expertise
produced a sentencing policy. In the context of sentencing defendants
under the age of twenty-one for using minors to commit federal
offenses, the Sentencing Commission has not demonstrated
institutional expertise as to why the factors listed in § 3553(a) would
be satisfied only through an application of the same use-of-minor
enhancement for every defendant, regardless of age. Instead of
utilizing its institutional strengths, the Sentencing Commission simply
promulgated a congressional directive in a “slightly broader form.” In
promulgating an enhancement pursuant to the congressional directive,
the Sentencing Commission wholly abrogated the relevance of the
defendant’s age in sentencing. Additionally, the Sentencing
Commission apparently concluded, without explanation, that the
proximity in age between the defendant and the minor used is also
irrelevant in meting out punishment consistent with § 3553(a).
Because there are no policy reasons or empirical data explaining these
unsupported conclusions, the Sentencing Commission’s decision to
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement without age restrictions is
not entitled to deference. This is particularly true when the Sentencing
Commission defies Congress’s intent. District courts are thus free to
disregard the Sentencing Commission’s policy decision and fully
357
embrace Congress’s expression of policy.
357. Interestingly, one federal circuit judge has indicated that defendants may be able
to argue that certain guidelines—such as section 3B1.4—may even “be irrelevant to
whether the sentence a party proposes is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to
satisfy” some of the purposes of sentencing in § 3553(a)(2). See United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). If a district court decided to reject an advisory Guidelines sentence under the
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After utilizing the policy-disagreement option to categorically
reject section 3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of
twenty-one, a district court would then calculate a Guidelines range
without a use-of-minor enhancement. If the district court determined
that an upward variance is required for a defendant’s use of a minor,
then the court is free to apply its own use-of-minor enhancement to
reach an appropriate sentence in the case. The import of a district
court’s discretion in an advisory Guidelines system is not to freely
disregard the Sentencing Commission’s justification for sentencing;
rather, it is to apply sound sentencing policy consistent with § 3553(a).
Even if a district court utilizes the policy-disagreement option, it must
still utilize the individualized-assessment option to determine the
appropriate sentence for a particular defendant. All district courts are
required to use the individualized-assessment option in every case.
One district court has apparently utilized the policy-disagreement
option in a post-Booker case to reject the application of section
3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement to a defendant under the age of
twenty-one. The district court in Delarosa surveyed the federal circuit
decisions on whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded
congressional authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without age
358
restrictions for defendants. Even though the Second Circuit had not
decided the issue, leaving the district court free to do so, the district
359
court nonetheless refused to take sides on the circuit split. In
essence, it rejected the opportunity to adopt the no-authority option.
The court nevertheless still refused to apply the Sentencing
Commission’s use-of-minor enhancement to a defendant who was a
minor and who used other minors who were older than the defendant
360
to commit a federal offense. In deciding not to apply a clearly
applicable guideline—section 3B1.4 applies to all defendants
regardless of age—the district court concluded that Congress never
intended the use-of-minor enhancement to apply to minors who are
361
younger than the minors used to commit the federal offense.
In effect, the district court utilized the policy-disagreement option
by issuing a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission
policy-disagreement option, the court would be entitled to no level of deference or respect
if the court’s wholesale rejection of a guideline included a guideline properly promulgated
under a congressional directive.
358. See United States v. Delarosa, No. 04 CR. 424-1(RWS), 2006 WL 1148698, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006).
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
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over the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a). The district court was
not using the individualized-assessment option to determine the
appropriate sentence only for this particular defendant. The court was
declaring that its view of national sentencing policy—consistent with
congressional intent—differed from the Sentencing Commission’s
such that the court would never apply a use-of-minor enhancement to
defendants under the age of eighteen who use minors older than the
defendant to commit a federal offense. Under the advisory Guidelines
system, the district court in Delarosa acted well within its discretion to
ignore a guideline that results in a sentence that is greater than
necessary to carry out the purposes of § 3553(a).
By exercising the policy-disagreement option, the district court in
Delarosa imposed a sentence on the defendant drastically below the
Guidelines’ sentence. If the court had applied a two-level use-ofminor enhancement under section 3B1.4, the defendant’s offense level
would have been 41. Given the offense level and a criminal history
category of II, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines
would have been between 360 months’ and life imprisonment. By
rejecting a use-of-minor enhancement for the seventeen-year-old
defendant who used older seventeen-year-old minors to commit the
federal offenses, the district court calculated a Guidelines’ range of
between 292 and 365 months’ imprisonment based on an offense level
362
of 39 and the same criminal history category. Further using the
discretion authorized by Booker, which inherently includes the
individualized-assessment option, the district court sentenced
363
Delarosa to 188 months’ imprisonment. The defendant’s resulting
sentence was nearly half of the bottom of the Guidelines’ range that
included a two-level use-of-minor enhancement. That is an
outstanding illustration of the high stakes that surround the issue of
national sentencing policy for use-of-minor enhancements for adult
defendants over the age of twenty-one as opposed to younger
defendants.
Once the district court properly utilizes the policy-disagreement
option to reject section 3B1.4’s application to all defendants, appellate
courts should defer to the district court. The Eleventh Circuit
poetically described a reviewing court’s obligation to defer to a district
court’s proper use of its sentencing discretion under the advisory
Guidelines system: “Because of the substantial deference district

362.
363.

See id. at *5–6.
See id. at *6, *8.
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courts are due in sentencing, we give their decisions about what is
364
reasonable wide berth and almost always let them pass.”
Another post-Booker case further illustrates how a district court
can reasonably utilize the policy-disagreement option to reject a
guideline. In United States v. Handy, a senior district judge in New
York rejected, on policy grounds, a guideline that enhanced sentences
for defendants who possess stolen firearms, regardless of the
365
defendant’s knowledge that the firearm was stolen. In doing so, the
district court disagreed with various circuit courts in concluding that
section 2K2.1(b)(4) of the Guidelines should not apply unless a
366
defendant knew or should have known that a firearm was stolen.
The district court questioned the constitutionality of section
2K2.1(b)(4), which can be appropriately characterized as exercising
the no-authority option. The court also made a passing reference that
the § 3553(a) factors do not support the application of strict liability—
as opposed to a knowledge requirement—for possessing a stolen
367
gun. This wholesale, categorical rejection of a guidelines’ use in all
similar cases constitutes the utilization of the policy-disagreement
option, which effectively makes a policy decision on what the national
sentencing policy should be on an issue. This analytical approach
indicates that if a reviewing court disagrees with a guideline on legal
grounds under the no-authority option—in this case, that section
2K2.1(b)(4)’s strict liability requirement is unconstitutional—then the
district court should also seek safe harbor in employing the policy368
disagreement option.
364. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); but see id. at
1169–80, 1199–1225 (holding that a district court’s downward variance from a Guideline’s
sentence based on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission’s choice to
promulgate Guidelines to sentence pedophiles was unreasonable for a host of reasons).
365. 570 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
366. See id. at 439–40; but see United States v. Black, 386 F. App’x 238, 241–42 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that section 2K2.1(b)(4)’s strict liability standard is valid); United
States v. Rolack, 362 F. App’x 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Perez, 585
F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 553–54 (7th
Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (same).
367. See Handy, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
368. Consistent with the principles enunciated in Kimbrough and Spears, numerous
federal courts have demonstrated that district courts have the discretionary authority to
reject various guidelines solely for policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission
about the need to apply an enhancement across-the-board as a categorical matter (the
policy-disagreement option), as opposed to simply making an individualized assessment
that an enhancement should not apply to a particular defendant’s case (individualizedassessment option). See, e.g., United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2010)
(acknowledging both parties’ concession that a district court acts within its authority to
reject a career-offender guideline based solely on a policy disagreement with the
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Following the lead of these courts and adopting the policydisagreement option, district courts can stand on firm ground in
deciding to reject the Sentencing Commission’s abrogation of
Congress’s intent to enhance sentences only for adult defendants at
least twenty-one years old. As long as the district court expressly
adopts the policy-disagreement option and supports its decision with
the reasoning in this Article, the district court should not anticipate a
reviewing court’s reversal.
D.

The Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines System Authorizes District
Courts to Utilize the Individualized-Assessment Option—Based
Solely on an Individualized Assessment of the Unique Facts and
Circumstances of a Single Case—to Sentence Defendants Younger
than Twenty-one Years of Age Without Applying the Use-ofMinor Enhancement

Even if a district court chooses not to utilize the no-authority
option or the policy-disagreement option to reject wholesale section
3B1.4’s application to defendants under the age of twenty-one, it can
still utilize the individualized-assessment option by using its
institutional strength to impose an outside-Guidelines sentence based
on the unique facts and circumstances of a single case that
demonstrate that the application of a use-of-minor enhancement to a
particular defendant under the age of twenty-one does not serve the
369
purposes of federal sentencing under § 3553(a)(2). This Article’s
focus is not to convince district courts to adopt the individualizedassessment option in sentencing defendants under the age of twentyone who use minors to commit federal offenses. As fully explored
already, this Article contends that the Sentencing Commission
Sentencing Commission); United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the district court acted unreasonably in failing to understand that it could
focus on the age of the defendant to impose a below-Guidelines sentence based solely on a
policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga,
571 F.3d 568, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court acted within its
authority to reject an illegal-reentry guideline based solely on a policy disagreement with
the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 194–95, 197 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that the district court acted within its authority to reject a firearms guideline
based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission); United States v.
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (rejecting a guideline in a child
pornography case based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission).
369. Again, the key distinction between the policy-disagreement option and the
individualized-assessment option is that the first option applies the district court’s policy
decision to all similar cases while the second option only reflects the district court’s
decision in a particular case involving a particular defendant.
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exceeded its congressional authority and defied Congress’s intent by
setting national sentencing policy with a use-of-minor enhancement
that makes the age of a defendant wholly irrelevant for sentencing
purposes. The result of this national policy is that every defendant
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense—no matter the age of
the defendant or the proximity in ages between the defendant and
minor used—will receive the same two-level enhancement.
Notwithstanding this Article’s focus on the Sentencing Commission’s
misuse of its authority in promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement
without an age restriction, the Article ultimately seeks to ensure that
sentencing courts faithfully carry out Congress’s intent to make age a
relevant factor in applying the use-of-minor enhancement. To that
end, the Article has first discussed a district court’s no-authority
option and policy-disagreement option. The Article would be remiss if
it then failed to also explain that the individualized-assessment option
can provide support for a district court to grant a downward variance
from a Guidelines sentence that includes a two-level use-of-minor
enhancement for a defendant under the age of twenty-one.
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough, the
370
Court also decided Gall v. United States. In Gall, the Court
expounded on the appropriate analytical framework that district
courts employ when sentencing a defendant under a post-Booker
advisory Guidelines system based on the institutionalized strengths of
district courts in making individualized assessments:
[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a
matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency,
the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark. The Guidelines are not the only consideration,
however. Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity
to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the
district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to
determine whether they support the sentence requested by a
party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines
range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented. If he decides that an outsideGuidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of
the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance. We find it
uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one. After settling on
370.

552 U.S. 38 (2007).
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the appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
371
promote the perception of fair sentencing.
District courts should clearly explain whether they are utilizing
the no-authority option, the policy-disagreement option, or the
individualized-assessment option. When a district court adopts the noauthority option or the policy-disagreement option, reviewing courts
will engage in a purely legal analysis of the district court’s conclusion
to reject a guideline. Little deference is due a district court under the
no-authority option—this is a decision that any court can make as a
matter of law. Although little deference will be allotted a district
372
court’s decision to use the policy-disagreement option, as long as the
court is not infringing on either Congress’s or the Sentencing
Commission’s authority to set national sentencing policy, then the
court should be well within its authority to adopt the policydisagreement option under an advisory Guidelines system.
When a district court utilizes the individualized-assessment
option, however, reviewing courts owe a great deal of deference under
an advisory sentencing system to the district court’s institutional
strengths to impose appropriate sentences to a particular defendant in
373
a given case. District courts should take great care to avoid
unwittingly masking the use of the policy-disagreement option as the
individualized-assessment option.
The Supreme Court has cautioned district courts against
mischaracterizing the use of their discretion. In Spears, the Court
instructed district courts to avoid varying from the Guidelines’ range
based on an apparent consideration of § 3553(a) factors in individual
cases where the court simply has a policy disagreement with the
Sentencing Commission over a guideline’s application to all similar
371. Id. at 49–50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Because of the important role
the Guidelines play in the consistent administration of justice nationally, the proper
application of the use-of-minor enhancement is critical to ensure fair sentences for
defendants who use minors to commit federal offenses. In that regard, it is plain to see how
the no-authority option and the policy-disagreement option serve a vital national interest,
because both options ensure that “the starting point and initial benchmark,” a Guidelines’
range, is properly achieved for cases involving a defendant under the age of twenty-one
who uses a minor to commit a federal offense.
372. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1255 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(explaining that “appellate courts should review [district] decisions more closely when they
rest upon disagreement with Guidelines policy.”).
373. See id. at 1254 (acknowledging that a “trial court typically better understands the
individual circumstances of particular cases before it” such that appellate courts should
provide a level of deference if the trial court adopts what this Article calls the
individualized-assessment option).
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cases. The Court stressed that district courts should openly state
their policy disagreements rather than “masking their categorical
375
policy disagreements as ‘individualized determinations.’” According
to the Court, a district court’s failure to be transparent with the reason
for the variance—policy disagreement or individualized assessment—
376
would amount to “institutionalized subterfuge.”
To avoid the sleight-of-hand characterization that could lead to
“institutionalized subterfuge,” district courts must simply ask whether
they intend to reject the application of the use-of-minor enhancement
to all cases involving a defendant under the age of twenty-one (which
would indicate adoption of the no-authority option or the policydisagreement option) or whether they simply reject the use-of-minor
enhancement’s application to a unique defendant in a particular case
(which would indicate adoption of the individualized-assessment
option).
Assume the following facts as an example of how a district court
can issue a reasonable, below-Guidelines sentence based on its
adoption of the no-authority option, policy-disagreement option, or
individualized-assessment option to reject the Sentencing
Commission’s expanded use-of-minor enhancement. Forty-year-old
adult A recruits eighteen-year-old adult B and seventeen-year-old
minor C to commit a federal offense. Recognizing opportunities for
themselves, B and C then recruit their best friend and high-school
classmate, minor D. At seventeen years old, D is only five days
younger than B and five days older than C. Assuming that A, B, and C
committed the same offenses and used minors to commit the offenses,
the district court would then apply the Guidelines to determine the
appropriate range. If A, B, and C had the same criminal history, then
the Guidelines’ range could be the same for the defendants. Adopting
the no-authority option or the policy-disagreement option, only A
would receive a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section
3B1.4. Thus, A’s Guidelines’ range, the initial starting point for
sentencing, would be higher than the range for B and C.
Without use of the no-authority option or the policydisagreement option, however, the Guidelines’ range would be the
same for A, B, and C. Under an advisory sentencing system, the
Guidelines’ range is only one factor to consider in meting out the
appropriate punishment for each individual defendant. The district
374.
375.
376.

See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009).
Id. at 266.
See id.
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court must consider the remaining § 3553(a) factors to ensure that
each defendant is given a sentence that is not greater than necessary
to carry out the purposes of federal sentencing. This is the point at
which the individualized-assessment option plays an important role.
Utilizing the individualized-assessment option, the district court could
conclude that A, B, and C should not all receive the same sentence
regardless of the application of the two-level use-of-minor
enhancement to set each defendant’s Guidelines’ range. Based on its
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court could stand on solid
ground in exercising its significant discretion to impose shorter
sentences for B and C and a longer sentence for A. That is, the district
court can determine what is an appropriate sentence for each of the
defendants under the individualized-assessment option. This option
allows the district court to consider anew the relevance of the
defendant’s age and the proximity in age between the defendants and
the minors used. If the Seventh Circuit was correct in its speculation
that the Sentencing Commission could have determined that some
defendants under the age of twenty-one can exert as much influence
over minors as do defendants over the age of twenty-one, then the
individualized-assessment option is the perfect place in the analytical
framework to reach this result. Otherwise, Congress’s intent to focus
enhanced sentences on adult defendants at least twenty-one years of
age who corrupts minors becomes insignificant when every defendant,
regardless of age, gets the same enhancement.
One might assume that the district court inherently reached the
same conclusion it would have had it adopted the no-authority option
or the policy-disagreement option. This is an unfair assumption.
Because the district court has the discretion under an advisory
Guidelines system, the district court can choose to vary from the
Guidelines by applying a sentence the court deems appropriate for a
certain case. For example, the court could reject the two-level use-ofminor enhancement in favor of a one-level use-of-minor enhancement
for B based on B’s age and proximity in age to D. Similarly, the court
could decide to impose a three-level use-of-minor enhancement for A,
who is significantly older than the minors used to commit a federal
offense. Finally, the court could choose not to apply a use-of-minor
enhancement at all for C, the youngest of the defendants who used a
minor older than C himself to commit a federal offense.
One district court has apparently utilized the individualizedassessment option to impose a sentence on a defendant under the age
of twenty-one regardless of the validity of section 3B1.4’s application.
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In United States v. Hawkins, the district court hedged its bets by
explicitly stating that regardless of whether it had erroneously applied
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement such that the sentencing
range was improperly inflated, the court would have sentenced the
377
defendant to the same 121 months’ imprisonment. The district court
said it would have imposed an upward variance from the advisory
378
sentencing range based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
This decision does not demonstrate a court’s policy objection to the
application of the use-of-minor enhancement, but rather stands as an
example of a district court’s attempt to use the individualizedassessment option in a particular case to apply an enhancement that is
required to mete out appropriate punishment for a particular
defendant. It further demonstrates that as far as section 3B1.4 is
concerned, district courts have as much authority as the Sentencing
Commission to determine the appropriate sentence for a defendant
under the age of twenty-one who uses a minor to commit a federal
offense. In Hawkins, the district court simply utilized the
individualized-assessment option to decide that a use-of-minor
enhancement was appropriate for a defendant under the age of
twenty-one even if it had generally decided that the no-authority
option and policy-disagreement option were viable in the mine-run
cases.
Admittedly, there has been much confusion about the amount of
discretion that district courts enjoy under an advisory Guidelines
system. Federal circuit courts have struggled with reviewing non379
Guidelines sentences for reasonableness. As long as district courts
display a clear understanding of the difference between their
institutional strengths and the Sentencing Commission’s institutional
strengths, district courts should feel comfortable in imposing
sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to carry
380
out the sentencing purposes contained in § 3553(a).
377. No. 08-CR-66-LRR, 2009 WL 2253188, at *13 (N.D. Iowa July 28, 2009), aff’d
sub nom., United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2010).
378. See id.
379. See, e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Russell, 537 F.3d 6,
13–14 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Gunter, 527 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S.
Ct. 2051 (2009); Spears I, supra note 328; Spears II, supra note 329.
380. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). In his concurring opinion in Pepper, Justice Breyer
provided a helpful, succinct framework on how best to conceptualize the sentencing roles
played by Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the judiciary:
[Congress] create[s] a Sentencing Commission with authority to develop
sentencing policy embodied in the Guidelines. The Guidelines are to further
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In summarizing Part VI, district courts accomplish the objective
of the Guidelines—to impose appropriate sentences—by employing a
three-step analytical framework. Under the no-authority option,
district courts should determine whether the Sentencing Commission’s
promulgation of a guideline complies with a congressional directive.
As discussed in Parts II to V, this Article contends that the Sentencing
Commission exceeded its congressional authority in promulgating
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement without an age restriction
for defendants. Based on the legal conclusion that section 3B1.4
cannot be applied to defendants under the age of twenty-one, district
courts should calculate the advisory Guidelines range without
applying the two-level use-of-minor enhancement for defendants who
were not yet twenty-one when they used a minor to commit a federal
offense. Even if a district court utilizes the no-authority option, the
court is still free to use the individualized-assessment option to impose
the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a) to a particular defendant,
which could increase or decrease the sentence from the Guidelines’
range.
If a district court rejects the no-authority option and decides that
the Sentencing Commission acted within its congressional authority in
promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age restriction for defendants
(or if the district court resides in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, or
Tenth Circuits, where that decision has already been reached), then
the district court may nonetheless use the policy-disagreement option
to reject the application of section 3B1.4 to defendants under the age
of twenty-one. To do so, district courts must explain that the
Sentencing Commission failed to utilize its institutional strengths and
sentencing expertise in promulgating section 3B1.4 and that
Congress’s approach to focus on adult defendants at least twenty-one
years of age reflects better sentencing policy. In the case of the
Sentencing Commission’s decision to promulgate a use-of-minor
enhancement in a “slightly broader form” than the congressional
[Congress’s] basic objective, namely greater sentencing uniformity, while also
taking account of special individual circumstances, primarily by permitting the
sentencing court to depart in nontypical cases. By collecting trial courts’ reasons
for departure (or variance), by examining appellate court reactions, by
developing statistical and other empirical information, by considering the views
of expert penologists and others, the Commission can revise the Guidelines
accordingly. Trial courts, appellate courts, and the Commission all have a role to
play in what is meant to be an iterative, cooperative institutional effort to bring
about a more uniform and a more equitable sentencing system.
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1255 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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directive, the Sentencing Commission showed no policy expertise as
to why defendants under the age of twenty-one who use a minor to
commit a federal offense should receive the same two-level
enhancement as any defendant regardless of age. Additionally, the
Sentencing Commission did not display its expertise on why the
proximity in age between a defendant and the minor used is irrelevant
for sentencing purposes, such that a defendant who is younger than
the minor used should receive the same enhancement as an adult
defendant who is much older than the minor used.
Finally, the post-Booker analytical framework allows district
courts to use the individualized-assessment option in a given case to
decide that the application of a guideline like section 3B1.4’s use-ofminor enhancement to a particular defendant results in an excessive
sentence when all of the § 3553(a) factors are considered. This option
should not be used as a policy disagreement with the Sentencing
Commission over a categorical application of the use-of-minor
enhancement to defendants under the age of twenty-one. Rather, it
should be limited to the unique facts and circumstances in a particular
defendant’s case.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article in no way takes a “get-weak-on-crime” position,
where the ultimate goal is the reduction in the lengths of sentences for
criminals who use minors to commit federal offenses. Moreover, this
Article does not seek to enter the general policy debate on the
appropriate sentences for defendants who are minors. Instead, this
Article promotes a healthy level of judicial review of the Sentencing
Commission’s exercise of its significant authority. Whenever the
Sentencing Commission complies with a congressional directive to
promulgate a guideline or uses its significant discretion and
institutional strengths to declare national sentencing policy to a broad
class of behavior, then there can be little doubt that the Sentencing
Commission’s policy decision should be respected in most cases.
When the Sentencing Commission defies Congress’s intent, ignores a
congressional directive, and exceeds its authority, courts must not
allow that unauthorized expansion of power to go unchecked. This
Article arms federal courts with three options to push back on the
Sentencing Commission’s unsubstantiated grab for excessive power in
promulgating a use-of-minor enhancement without age restrictions for
defendants.
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When the Sentencing Commission promulgated section 3B1.4’s
enhancement without age restrictions for defendants, it made a
national sentencing policy that all defendants—regardless of how old
or how young or how close in age the defendant is to the minor
used—should receive the same two-level enhancement for using
minors to commit federal offenses. A review of the congressional
directive’s plain language to the Sentencing Commission to
promulgate a use-of-minor enhancement, the legislative history
behind the directive, and the context in which the directive was
enacted reveals that Congress intended that only adult defendants at
least twenty-one years old would receive a sentence enhancement for
corrupting a minor by using him to commit a federal offense. Because
the Sentencing Commission ignored a clear congressional directive
and defied Congress’s intent, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
authority in promulgating section 3B1.4 without an age restriction for
defendants. As such, district courts should utilize the no-authority
option to conclude that no defendant under the age of twenty-one
should receive a two-level use-of-minor enhancement under section
3B1.4. Because federal circuit courts are split on the issue of the
Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate a use-of-minor
enhancement that makes the age of a defendant entirely irrelevant,
381
the Supreme Court must resolve the circuit split.
In addition to the legal conclusion that the Sentencing
Commission lacked the authority to enhance sentences for defendants
under the age of twenty-one who use minors to commit federal
offenses (i.e., the no-authority option), district courts have two other
options to push back on the Sentencing Commission’s unlawful
expansion of the congressional directive. District courts can use either
the policy-disagreement option or the individualized-assessment
option. A district court’s adoption of either of these options would act
as insulation from the circuit split on the no-authority option.

381. In the meantime, district courts in the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits do not have the authority to utilize the no-authority option, because these circuits
have already decided that the Sentencing Commission acted within its authority in
promulgating section 3B1.4. District courts in the Sixth Circuit also do not technically have
the authority to utilize the no-authority option, but for a different reason—the Sixth
Circuit has already utilized that option. District courts in all other circuits can adopt the
no-authority option as explained in this Article. Of course, the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits, sitting en banc, could also adopt the no-authority option, which would
resolve the circuit split and eliminate the need for the Supreme Court to address the
viability of the no-authority option.
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District courts have the authority to adopt what this Article coins
the policy-disagreement option. When the Sentencing Commission
seeks to establish national sentencing policy in an area in which it
lacks institutional expertise by promulgating a guideline like section
3B1.4, courts have the discretionary authority to check that use of
power by categorically rejecting the guideline based on a policy
disagreement. In cases involving section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor
enhancement, this policy-disagreement option inherently rejects the
application of the two-level use-of-minor enhancement to defendants
under the age of twenty-one. In essence, district courts that exercise
the policy-disagreement option are choosing to follow Congress’s
intent on how to treat adult defendants who use minors as opposed to
the Sentencing Commission’s unsupported decision to apply the same
two-level enhancement to every defendant, regardless of the
defendant’s age or the proximity in age between the defendant and
the minor. The policy-disagreement option inherently recognizes that
under an advisory Guidelines system, the Sentencing Commission’s
authority to set national sentencing policy is only as strong as its
compliance with a congressional directive or its use of its institutional
strengths and sentencing expertise. In areas such as the appropriate
punishment for defendants who use minors to commit federal
offenses, the Sentencing Commission loses its vaulted status as a body
with institutional strengths when it fails to explain why it is setting
national sentencing policy and even more when it defies a
congressional directive. Every district court in every circuit has the
discretionary authority to utilize the policy-disagreement option to
ensure that defendants under the age of twenty-one do not receive
section 3B1.4’s use-of-minor enhancement as part of the Guidelines’
range.
District courts can also use their own institutional strengths in
making individualized assessments in particular cases that fall outside
the heartland of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Commission
such that a variance from a Guideline’s sentence is appropriate under
§ 3553(a). By utilizing the individualized-assessment option, district
courts may determine that an advisory Guidelines’ sentence would
result in an excessive sentence, thus failing to achieve the purposes of
federal sentencing under § 3553(a). When confronted with the unique
facts of a particular case involving a defendant under the age of
twenty-one who used a minor to commit a federal offense, district
courts have the authority to determine—solely for purposes of that
particular case—that section 3B1.4’s two-level enhancement should
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not be applied so that an appropriate sentence can be imposed on an
individual defendant.
Given the Sentencing Commission’s unlawful expansion of the
congressionally directed use-of-minor enhancement, district courts
have the authority to adopt the no-authority option, policydisagreement option, or individualized-assessment option to ensure
that Congress’s intent is followed by applying section 3B1.4 only to
defendants who are at least twenty-one years of age. As long as this
three-option, analytical framework on how to approach the advisory
Guidelines system is followed, district courts are well equipped to
mete out punishment consistent with § 3553(a), while ensuring that
the Sentencing Commission continues to play a vital role in national
sentencing policy within its congressionally sanctioned power.

